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THE DIGITAL TRADEMARK RIGHT: A
TROUBLING NEW EXTRATERRITORIAL
REACH OF UNITED STATES LAW
XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN*

The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act authorizes the
development of the digital trademark right. Under this new right,
a trademark owner can petition a domestic court to transfer a
foreign registrant's domain name to the trademark owner. The
trademarkowner does not need to travel to the foreign land for the
litigation or to petition a foreign court for enforcement of the
domestic court's decision. The property transfer order has a
global effect, enjoining the foreign registrantfrom further use of its
property in its home country. Is such extraterritorialextension of
national law permissible? Does the new digital trademark right
undermine internationalefforts attempting to resolve international
domain name disputes? This Article addressesthese questions.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you own an Internet company headquartered in the
United States. You obtained your domain name from a, registrar in
your home state and have never traveled to the Far East for business
purposes. You are happy that you have survived the dot.com crash.
Then, you receive a call from your attorney, informing you that your
domain name has been named as a defendant in a lawsuit in China.
You ask your attorney to repeat herself. Your domain name is the
defendant, not you. The plaintiff in the suit alleges that your domain
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name violates his rights because your domain name is similar to his
trademark in China. You send your attorney to China to investigate
and defend your property rights in the domain name. The Chinese
court rules that your domain name violates the plaintiff's trademark
right and, therefore, pursuant to new Chinese legislation, orders a
domain name registrar in China to transfer your domain name to the
plaintiff.
Now, substitute the United States for China in the previous
example and welcome to the digital trademark rightl-a national law
with extraterritorial reach.
The expansion of the Internet and e-commerce in the 1990s
justified the creation of new laws relating to intellectual property.'
The rapid growth of borderless, electronic commerce brought new
development and challenges to trademark law and trademark owners,
particularly in the areas of protection,3 enforcement, 4 and branding in
the new medium of electronic communication and commerce. 5 The
1. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Title III, 113
Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)) [hereinafter ACPA]. The
ACPA amends the Lanham Act-the federal trademark and unfair competition law. See
Lanham Act, ch. 540, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 427-46 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1129 (2000)).
2. See JESSICA LITMAN AMHERST, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 27-34 (2001) (providing a
thoughtful critique of the digital copyright regime embodied in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998).
3. See generally Gregory D. Phillips, Necessary Protections for Famous Trademark
Holders on the Internet, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 635, 637-41 (1999) (discussing
problems faced by famous trademark holders in cyberspace); Todd W. Krieger, Note,
Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: Strategies for Protecting Brand Names in
Cyberspace, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 47, 62-64 (1998) (discussing strategies to protect
trademarks in cyberspace). The phenomenon is not confined to the United States,
however. The European Union has also created new laws relating to intellectual property.
For example, the European Union adopted a directive on digital copyright protection
providing, among other things, protection against the circumvention of technological
measures designed to protect copyrighted works. See Directive 2001/29/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10,
http://europa.eu.intlinformation-society/topics/multi/digital-rights/doc/
at
available
directive.copyright-en.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Grace Bergen,
The Napster Case: The Whole World is Listening, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 259, 270 (2002)
(stating that the European Union's digital copyright directive mirrors the U.S. Digital
Millennium Copyright Act).

4. See Puneet Singh, Gateway Pages: A Solution to the Domain Name Conflict?, 91
TRADEMARK REP. 1226, 1227 (2001) (analyzing the trademark-domain name conflict in
digital commerce). See generally Dale M. Cendali, Legal Developments in Trademark
Law and the Internet, 661 PLI/PAT 259 (2001) (identifying various trademark problems
online).
5. See Eric Goldman & Candice Lee, UnderstandingInternet Co-BrandingDeals, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 65 (1999) (explaining co-branding

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

most profound change in trademark jurisprudence, however, has been
the development of the digital trademark right.
The Anticybersquatting Protection Act ("ACPA") authorizes
the development of the digital trademark right. Under the digital
trademark right, a trademark owner can petition a U.S. court to
transfer a foreign national's domain name to the trademark owner6
despite the fact that the foreign national has never transacted
business in any forum within the United States to the trademark
owner. The court's property transfer order is tantamount to
enjoining the foreign national's conduct extraterritorially.7 The
extraterritorial reach erodes fundamental principles of trademark law
and has serious international implications.8 Further, within the
development of the new right, the District Court of the Eastern
District of Virginia is being transformed into an international tribunal
that unilaterally adjudicates multinational property rights in domain
names.
The ACPA's new digital trademark right represents a unilateral
imposition of domestic U.S. law on foreign nations.9 As such, this
new digital trademark law raises several questions. How, if at all, for
example, is the extraterritorial extension of the digital trademark
right permissible? More specifically, does a U.S. court have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights in domain names held by foreign
nationals who have never transacted business in any forum in the
United States? Furthermore, has the ACPA transformed the Eastern
District of Virginia into the default venue to adjudicate property
rights in all domain names-somewhat of an international tribunal?
All of this begs the ultimate question: whether the ACPA's new
digital trademark right is in conflict with international principles of
trademark territoriality,"° international comity," and jurisdiction to
practices on the Internet and how fees are generated from various co-branding structures);
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-commerce: Move Over Inherently
Distinctive Trademarks-The E-brand, I-brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to
Power?,50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 952-58 (2001) (analyzing the use of generic trademarks as
a branding method in electronic commerce).
6. ACPA, 113 Stat. 1501A (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)). Although
the ACPA can be used to transfer the domain names of U.S. citizens, this Article's
discussion is confined to the application of the ACPA to foreign nsationals.
7. See infra note 402 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Section V.
9. See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
10. Trademark territoriality provides that each "trademark is recognized as having a
separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally recognized
as a mark." 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 29:1, at 29-4 to 29-5 (2000) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
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prescribe 12 and will undermine international efforts to resolve
multinational domain name disputes? This Article addresses these
burgeoning questions.
This Article argues that the new digital trademark right
unilaterally expands U.S. trademark rights beyond the permissible
boundary of the territoriality doctrine and transforms such rights into
a universally recognized trademark right. The discussion will proceed
as follows, Section I examines the limited extraterritorial application
of the Lanham Act before the arrival of borderless, electronic
commerce.
Section II focuses on the shift in the medium of commerce and
the clash of domain names with trademark rights. The role of domain
names and the global accessibility to domain names provide benefits
to trademark holders and cyber-entrepreneurs, and simultaneously
invites abusive cybersquatting activities on the Internet.
Section III analyzes the new law, examining the legislative

history to ascertain its purposes. How the new law authorizes the
development of the digital trademark right through the in rem
provision will be identified and critiqued in Section IV. In addition to
examining the manifestation of the digital trademark right, Section IV

focuses on the by-product of the new right, the formation of a default
in rem cyberjurisdiction court and its transformation to an
11. Black's Law Dictionary defines "comity" as, inter alia, "a willingness to grant a
privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 139 (5th ed. 1983). The definition explains that comity is a "[r]ecognition
that one sovereignty allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial act
of another sovereignty, having due regard to rights of its own citizen." Id. Further, the
principle of "comity" is that "courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and
judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of
deference and mutual respect." Id. Likewise, the Third Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States indicates that:
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101
cmt. e (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163-64 (1895)).
12. The Restatement, in discussing jurisdiction to prescribe, notes that:
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on (a) jurisdiction to
prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of
persons, or the interest of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive
act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, §§ 401 & 401(a).
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international tribunal for adjudicating foreign nationals' proper rights
in domain names.
Section V critiques the extraterritorial reach of the digital
trademark right in the context of international law, principles of
trademark territoriality as embraced by the Paris Convention,
jurisdiction to prescribe, and international comity. Section V also
analyzes how the new right reaches beyond the jurisdictional

limitations imposed for fifty years in trademark jurisprudence, and
the global implications of the new right in the nascent borderless,

electronic commerce.
After analyzing the potential violations of established United
States trademark jurisprudence and international law principles, as
well as various other undesirable implications of the ACPA's new
digital trademark right, Section VI explores alternative methods of
resolving international disputes relating to trademarks and domain
names. The Article concludes that, at this juncture, because
trademarks are leaning toward universality, an international regime
may resolve such disputes and avoid problems stemming from
applying national law in international context.
I. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE LANHAM ACT
PRIOR TO THE ANTICYBERSQUATrING PROTECTION

A.

ACT

Bulova and the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Lanham Act

Trademarks are valuable corporate property.13 Trademarks
function as source identifiers, assisting consumers to purchase
products or services without incurring independent research costs. 14
13. See, e.g., Russell L. Parr, The Value of Trademarks, in ALI-ABA, TRADEMARKS,
COPYRIGHTS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, C913
ALI-ABA 229, 235 (1994) (stating the trademark "Marlboro" has been valued at $65
billion); Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws Abroad, 44
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 585, 586 (October 1, 1992) (noting that the
trademark "Coca-Cola" has been valued at $24 billion); see also Rudolf Rayle, The Trend
Towards Enhancing Trademark Owners' Right-A Comparative Study of U.S. and
German Trademark Law, 7 J.INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 232 (2000) (stating that trademarks
"became business assets and today are maybe the most valuable asset on a company's
balance sheet" and noting that Coca-Cola valued at $84 billion, Microsoft at $57 billion,
and IBM at $47 billion); John V. Tait, Trademark Regulations and Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Focusing on the Regulatory Objective to Classify Speech for the First
Amendment Analysis, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 897, 937 (1998) (noting the Nike trademark is
valued at $7.3 billion).
14. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("In economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs by informing
people that trademarked products come from the same source."); see also 1 MCCARTHY,
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Legal protection for trademarks is territorial; 15 that is, trademark

rights exist in each country solely according to that country's law. 6 In
the United States, the statutory scheme governing trademark rights is
commonly known as the Lanham Act. 7
Under the Lanham Act, an owner of a protected trademark has
the exclusive right to use the trademark in commerce, benefits from
the goodwill associated with the trademark, and prevents others from
using a trademark that may cause a likelihood of consumer confusion
as to the source of the trademarked goods or services.18 Courts
interpreting the Lanham Act, consistently with the trademark
territoriality doctrine, generally have confined the trademark owner's
rights to the United States. 9 In other words, the trademark owner
can only initiate an action against a defendant for using a similar
trademark on goods or services in U.S. commerce. 2° Thus far, the
territoriality doctrine has served as a constraint on the extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act.
The territoriality doctrine states that a trademark is treated as

having an independent existence in each nation in which it is
recognized as a protected trademark.2 As a byproduct of this
supra note 10, §§ 2.4-2.5 (discussing the search costs reducing function of trademarks);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987) (explaining how trademarks reduce search costs). See
generally Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 969-75 (2001) (reviewing the evolution of
trademark function from a source-identifying to a quality-identifying function).
15. See Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The concept
of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country solely
according to that country's statutory scheme.").
16. See id.; British-American Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 2000 TTAB LEXIS
390, at *9 (Trademark & Trial App. Bd. June 14, 2000) (acknowledging the wellestablished doctrine of territoriality of trademark rights), affd, 2001 TTAB LEXIS 167
(Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Feb. 27,2001); see also, e.g., Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L.,
935 F. Supp. 458, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ruling that mere advertising efforts of the Milan
"Fashion Caf" in the United States failed to constitute "use in commerce" under the
Lanham Act because such advertising only had an impact on commerce in Milan), affd,
139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
17. See 15 U.S.C §§ 1051-1129 (2000); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 5:4-5:10, at 59 to 5-20. (reviewing the history of statutory trademark law).
18. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (detailing the trademark
territoriality doctrine).
19. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
21. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:1, at 29-4 to 29-5 (explaining that, under the
territoriality doctrine, a trademark has a separate legal existence in each territory in which
the trademark is legally registered and recognized). "There are some exceptions to the
doctrine of territoriality in U.S. law, such as famous trademarks, priority application filing
status, registration of marks based on foreign filings and registrations and geographical
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Balkanization of trademark rights, the territoriality principle dictates
that the law of the country where consumers are likely to be confused
as to the source of the goods, not where the trademark was affixed to
the goods, will govern disputes pertaining to the trademark.22
Therefore, under the territoriality principle, when litigating in a U.S.
court trademark disputes that arose from conduct occurring in the
United States, U.S. law will apply-the law of foreign nations,
regardless of the citizenship of the parties, is irrelevant and
inadmissible. 23 By the same token, when litigating in a foreign
country trademark disputes that arose from conduct that occurred in
the

foreign

country,

that

foreign

country's

law

will

apply,

notwithstanding that the defendant might be a U.S. citizen.24
The territoriality principle is fundamental to trademark law and
is based upon consideration of international comity, observance of
national sovereignty, and an understanding of the difficulty of
enforcement of domestic law extraterritorially.25
Due to the
increased globalization of commerce and communication, however,
goods travel across national geographical borders with ease.26
indications."

British-American Tobacco, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 390, at *12 (citing 4
supra note 10, § 29:1, at 29-4 to 29-5). These exceptions to the territoriality
doctrine are created by international treaties and conventions to which the United States
is a member. See id.; see also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 633-34
(2d Cir. 1956) (discussing international convention relating to trademarks and unfair
competition and how it applies to foreign nationals and U.S. citizens).
22. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:1, at 29-4 to 29-5 (noting trademark
territoriality principle is also based on considerations of the place where the
misrepresentation occurs, not where the plaintiff suffers a loss).
23. See Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting
that the prior use of a trademark in Japan does not have any relevance in U.S. priority
law); Vanity FairMills, 234 F.2d at 639 ("[F]oreign law confers no privilege in this country
that our courts are bound to recognize. And when trademark rights within the United
States are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of foreign courts concerning
the respective trademark rights of the parties are irrelevant and inadmissible." (citation
omitted)).
24. See Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001) (ruling that the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant, a U.S. company, is
infringing on the plaintiff's trademark rights in Lebanon and ruling that defendant's use of
the trademark in Lebanon is subject to Lebanese law); Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 639
("Similarly, the rights and liabilities of United States citizens who compete with foreign
nationals in their home countries are ordinarily to be determined by the appropriate
foreign law.").
25. See Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 639 (noting trademark territoriality is a
fundamental principle "and is based upon practical considerations such as the difficulty of
obtaining extraterritorial enforcement of domestic law, as well as on considerations of
international comity and respect for national integrity").
26. See generally Melvin Simensky, The New Role of Intellectual Property in
Commercial Transactions,10 ENT. & SPORTS L. 5 (1992) (stating that the increase in new
trade agreements allows goods and services bearing trademarks to flow more freely across
MCCARTHY,
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Consequently, goods bearing trademarks protected under the
Lanham Act are sold outside the United States without the
authorization of the trademark owners. 7 Because most foreign
nations do not provide protection to trademarks under the same
standard as in the Lanham Act, American trademark owners
generally do not litigate trademark infringement actions in foreign
nations. 28 Furthermore, American trademark owners and attorneys
are most likely not familiar with the court system in foreign nations.
Litigation in a foreign country can be very costly and, despite the
added expense, the result is often uncertain.2 9 Thus, American
trademark owners logically look to domestic courts for protection
against infringement activities occurring beyond the United States
geographical boundaries.30 In other words, American trademark
owners seek domestic court orders that have extraterritorial effects. 1
national boundaries). Two examples of international agreements relating to trademarks
are the Madrid Protocol and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS"). See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994); Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks, adopted June 27, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E),
available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/index.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). See generally Bruce A. McDonald, International Intellectual Property
Rights, 35 INT'L L. 465, 471-90 (2001) (reviewing recent international treaties and
agreements relating to trademarks, copyrights, and patents); Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski,
The InternationalProtection of Trademarks After the TRIPS Agreement, 9 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L LAW. 189, 206-12 (1998) (analyzing trademark protection under TRIPS and
comparing such protection to the Paris Convention's provisions).
27. See William Richelieu, Note, Gray Days Ahead?: The Impact of Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l Inc., 27 PEPP. L. REV. 827, 827-29 (2000)
(discussing the ease with which distributors move goods through international commerce
and the substantial costs that manufacturers incur as a result of the movement).
28. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L., 505, 506-07 (1997) (stating that U.S. intellectual property
laws are more protective than the intellectual property laws of many other nations, and
noting that U.S. courts have broad discovery rules and are likely to award large damages
to the intellectual property holders).
29. See Lionel S. Sobel, Pursuing the Home Court Advantage in International
Trademark Litigation, ENT. L. REP., Aug. 1997, at 4; see also John Fellas, Important
Doctrines and Tools of InternationalLitigation,648 PLI/LIT 9, 26-117 (2001) (providing a
comprehensive review of the issues for litigators to consider in international litigation);
Mark P. Zimmett, Ethics in International Commercial Litigation and Arbitration, 648
PLI/LIT 539, 545-607 (2001) (discussing differences in ethics rules and issues in
international litigation).
30. See, e.g., At. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189, 190-91 (2d Cir.
1998) (determining whether the plaintiff, holder of the ARCO trademark, can enjoin the
defendant from using 'Arco Globus International' in the Soviet Union); Nintendo of Am.,
Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1994) (pursuing a trademark action
against the defendant for selling cartridges in Canada and Mexico); Calvin Klein Indus.,
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Despite the efforts of American trademark owners, the Supreme

Court in its 1952 decision in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,32 held that
the Lanham Act could govern extraterritorial trademark disputes
when the acts constituting trademark infringement and unfair
competition adversely affect United States commerce.3 3 In that case,

the plaintiff, Bulova Watch Co., sought to enjoin the use of its
BULOVA trademark on watches sold in Mexico City.34 The plaintiff
had registered its trademark in the United States, but not in Mexico.35

The defendant, an American citizen, purchased watch components in
the United States and subsequently shipped them to Mexico, where
the watches were assembled and affixed with the BULOVA
trademark.3 6
The district court dismissed the complaint with

prejudice on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
trademark infringement and acts of unfair competition consummated
in Mexico by a citizen and resident of the United States.37 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the pleadings and evidence disclosed a

Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (deciding whether
the trademark holder can preliminarily enjoin the defendant from distributing and selling
sportswear bearing the trademark in countries outside the United States where the
trademark holder has a presence); Serge G. Avakian, Comment, Global Unfair
Competition in the Online Commerce Era, 46 UCLA L. REV. 905, 913-16 (1999)
(discussing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing,Inc., where the plaintiff,
the trademark holder, sought an injunction against the defendant for the defendant's use
of the 'Playmen' trademark on publications and products sold and distributed in the
United States).
31. See, e.g., Atd. Richfield Co., 150 F.3d at 192-94 (affirming the district court's ruling
that the Lanham Act did not reach the defendant's allegedly infringing activities abroad
because they lacked substantial effect on United States commerce); Nintendo, 34 F.3d at
249-51 (holding the extraterritorial trademark infringement conduct could not be enjoined
under the U.S. law); Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enter., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.
1992) (affirming the district court's injunction under the Lanham Act against defendant's
conduct in Mexico).
32. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
33. See id. at 285-87.
34. Id. at 281.
35. Id. at 285.
36. Id. at 282-85 (stating the defendant, a resident of San Antonio, was in the watch
business first in the United States and later in Mexico, registered the Bulova trademark in
Mexico, imported Swiss-made watches from Switzerland and the United States into
Mexico, stamped the watches with the Bulova trademark, and distributed the spurious
Bulova watches to retail jewelers in the Mexican border area where the watches
subsequently entered the U.S. stream of commerce).
37. Id. at 282. (stating the district court's decision was based on its findings that the
defendant had committed no illegal acts within the United States).
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cause of action within the reach of the Lanham Act.38 The defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court noted that the defendant's scheme injured the
plaintiff's business reputation in the United States and abroad.39 As a
result of the defendant's distribution of watches bearing a spurious
mark, the plaintiff had received numerous complaints from retail
jewelers in Texas about the counterfeit BULOVA watches,4"
demonstrating that the defendant's conduct was not confined to
Mexico; it affected the United States.4' Because the Lanham Act
holds liable in a civil action asserted by a trademark registrant any
person who infringes a protected trademark in commerce lawfully
regulated by Congress, the effects of defendant's conduct, though the
conduct originated in Mexico, were felt in the United States and the
conduct was, therefore within the scope of the Act.4 2 Though acts of
Congress generally do not extend beyond the boundaries of the
United States unless a contrary legislative intent exists,43 Congress,
nevertheless, has the power to prescribe "standards of conduct for
American citizens, may project the impact of its laws beyond the
territorial boundaries of the United States."'
Further, there is no
international law preventing the United States from governing the
conduct of its own citizens in a foreign nation.45
In addition, the Court found no conflict with Mexican
sovereignty, as the defendant's BULOVA trademark registration in
Mexico was nullified by the Supreme Court of Mexico. 6
Accordingly, the Court held that Congress intended the Lanham Act
to reach such trademark-infringing conduct occurring outside the
38. Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 570-72 (5th Cir. 1952) (reversing the
district court's decision on the ground that the defendant's use of the Bulova trademark on
watches caused sufficient effect on United States commerce).
39. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 285-87 (finding the defendant's spurious Bulova watches
filtered through the Mexican border into the United States where such watches competed
with the plaintiff's genuine Bulova watches, reflecting adversely on the plaintiff's
reputation in markets cultivated by years of advertising in the United States and abroad).
40. Id. at 285.
41. Id. at 286-87.
42. Id. at 285-89.
43. Id. at 285.
44. Id. at 282.
45. Id. at 285-86. The Bulova court noted that Justice Minton's rationale on an unfair
competition case lent support to its interpretation of congressional intent under the
Lanham Act. Id. at 286 (quoting Branch v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir.
1944) ("Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by
citizens of the United States, although some of the acts are done outside the territorial
limits of the United States.")).
46. Id.
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United States but having adverse effects on United States
commerce.47 The lower court's injunctive relief against defendant's
infringing conduct in Mexico was proper. 8
Essentially, Bulova dictates that extraterritorial application of
the Lanham Act is permissible only in cases where the defendant is a
United States citizen, the defendant's conduct-constituting either
trademark infringement or unfair competition-though occurring in a
foreign country affects United States commerce, and there is no
conflict between U.S..law and the foreign nation's law resulting from
the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.49 When all of
these requirements are satisfied, the court can extend the Lanham
Act to govern the American defendant's conduct in the foreign
country. °
Bulova signaled a judicial trend of extending the application of
the Lanham Act extraterritorially. The decision shifted the inquiry
from the place where the illegal conduct occurred to where the effects
of the conduct radiated." Indeed, lower courts follow Bulova in
determining whether a specific circumstance would warrant subject
matter jurisdiction over claims involving extraterritorial application
of the Lanham Act and whether to issue an injunction prohibiting
extraterritorial conduct that violates the Lanham Act and affects U.S.
52
commerce.
47. See id. at 286-87.
48. Id. at 289.
49. See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1956) (analyzing
the court's holding in Bulova).
50. See id. (explaining the Bulova rationale for the requirements).
51. As the Bulova Court noted, in an earlier case, American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., the Court held that a violation of American laws could not be grounded on acts
on foreign land. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 288 (discussing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)). The Bulova Court noted that the inquiry in American Banana
was the locus of the defendant's conduct, the United Fruit Company's alleged
monopolization of the banana import trade between Central American and the United
States as seen through the defendant's alleged instigation of the Costa Rican government's
seizure of the plaintiff's plantation and produce in Panama. Id. The Bulova Court read
American Banana as not to "confer blanket immunity on trade practices which radiate
unlawful consequences" to the United States, "merely because they were initiated or
consummated outside the territorial limits of the United States." Id. Indeed, the Bulova
Court distinguished its case from American Banana because the defendant's conduct in
Bulova radiated effects that reached the United States and were unlawful under the law of
the United States. Id. Accordingly, Bulova began extraterritoriality application with an
inquiry focusing on the effects of the defendant's conduct radiated. Id.
52. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir.
1994) (applying the BulovallVanity Fair test in determining whether to apply the Lanham
Act to bar the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark in Mexico and Canada); Am.
Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 412-16 (5th Cir. 1983)
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Post-Bulova Trend

Notably, the Second Circuit in Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.
followed Bulova and announced a tripartite test to determine the
extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act to conduct occurring outside
the United States.53 The three prongs of the test include: (1) whether
the defendant was a United States citizen; (2) whether the
defendant's conduct had a substantial effect on United States
commerce; and (3) whether there was a conflict with trademark law
rights established under foreign law, rendering the application of the
Lanham Act inappropriate in light of international comity concerns. 4
Lacking any of the three factors might well be "determinative," and
the absence of any two factors is certainly "fatal."55
The defendant in Vanity Fair, a Canadian corporation, engaged
in the retail merchandising business throughout Canada56 under the
Canadian registration of the VANITY FAIR trademark." Defendant
(applying the Bulova/Vanity Fair test in determining whether to apply the Lanham Act to
bar the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademarks in Saudi Arabia); Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 427-29 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying the
Bulova/Vanity Fair test in determining whether to apply the Lanham Act to bar the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark in Europe); Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 64143 (applying Bulova in determining whether to apply the Lanham Act to bar the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark in Canada).
53. See Vanity FairMills, 234 F.2d at 642-43.
54. See id.; see also Totalplan Corp. v. Colborne, 14 F.3d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1994)
(applying the Vanity Fair three factor test). The Vanity Fair Mills court believed that
Bulova emphasized the three factors in its inquiry of whether the district court had
jurisdiction to prevent defendant's unfair use of the plaintiff's Bulova trademark in
Mexico. The Vanity Fair Mills court stated that Bulova's rationale "was so thoroughly
based on the power of the United States to govern 'the conduct of its own citizens upon
the high seas or even in foreign countries .... ' " Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 642.
Indeed, in a footnote, the Vanity Fair Mills court quoted a portion of Bulova for support
of the tripartite test:
Congress in prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens may project
the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. ...
Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by
citizens of the United States, although some of the acts are done outside the
territorial limits of the United States. . . . Mexico's courts have nullified the
Mexican registration of 'Bulova'; there is thus no conflict which might afford
petitioner a pretext that such relief would impugn foreign law. The question,
therefore, whether a valid foreign registration would affect either the power to
enjoin or the propriety of its exercise is not before us. Where, as here, there can
be no interference with the sovereignty of another nation, the District Court in
exercising its equity powers may command persons properly before it to cease or
perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction.
Id,at 643 n.13 (quoting Bulova, 344 U.S. at 280-86) (citations omitted).
55. See Vanity FairMills, 234 F.2d at 643.
56. Id. at 637.
57. Id.
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expanded its business to the United States and established a regular
place of business in New York.58 The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania
corporation, was in the business of manufacturing and selling
women's underwear under its VANITY FAIR trademark in the
United States and Canada. 9 The plaintiff alleged that defendant had
advertised VANITY FAIR underwear in the United States and that it
had sold such underwear by mail to customers residing in the United
States.6" Specifically, the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the
defendant's use of VANITY FAIR in connection with women's
underwear both in Canada and the United States.61
The Second Circuit applied the three-factor test and found that
only the second factor was present-the defendant's conduct had a
substantial effect on United States commerce. Accordingly, the
Second Circuit concluded that the Lanham Act's generous remedies
should not be extended to restrain foreign citizens from acting under
presumably valid trademarks in a foreign country. 62 The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that it satisfied the other two
requirements because many American citizens were employed in
defendant's New York office. 63 These employees, however, as the
Second Circuit noted, did not direct or control the affairs of the
defendant's company.' All of defendant's officers and directors who
managed the company's affairs were Canadian citizens and the action
was brought against Canadian citizens.65 Under Canadian trademark
law, the defendant's conduct, occurring in Canada, arguably was
lawful.6 6

Accordingly, the district court's decision to decline

jurisdiction over claims of trademark infringement and unfair
competition occurred in Canada was proper.67
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 638.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 642-43.
63. Id. at 643.
64. Id.
65. Id. Because the defendants were Canadian citizens, the first requirement failed.
Id. Further, there might be conflict of law if the court extended the Lanham Act
extraterritorially because the defendant's trademark use in Canada seemed to be proper
under Canadian law. Id. Accordingly, under Bulova's rationale that U.S. law could only
govern "the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries
when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed," the court declined to
extend the Lanham Act against foreign citizens acting under presumably valid trademarks
in a foreign country. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,
285-86 (1952)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 647-48.
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Twenty-one years after the Second Circuit decided Vanity Fair,

the Ninth Circuit addressed the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham
Act in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.68 The Ninth
Circuit, however, rejected the substantial effect on United States
commerce requirement and substituted it with a more elaborate test.69
Other circuit courts have followed suit and developed variations of
the Vanity Fair test to determine whether to extend the jurisdictional
reach of the Lanham Act.7"

68. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 427-29 (9th Cir.
1977).
69. See, e.g., id. at 428 (adopting the jurisdictional Rule of Reason analysis for
antitrust cases set forth in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976)); see also Reebok Int'l v. Marinatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554-55 (9th
Cir. 1992) (applying the Timberlane test). The Timberlane test requires three elements:
(1) some effect on American foreign commerce; (2) the effect must be sufficiently great to
present a cognizable injury under the statute; and (3) the interests of and links to
American foreign commerce be sufficiently strong in relation to other nations to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority. See Timberlane, 970 F.2d at 554 (quoting Star-Kist
Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985)). The third
requirement involves the balancing of seven factors: (1) the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy; (2) the nationality of the parties and the locations or principal places of
business of the corporations; (3) the extent to which the enforcement of United States law
could be expected to achieve compliance; (4) the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared to effects elsewhere; (5) whether the explicit purpose of the
defendant was to harm American commerce; (6) the foreseeability of such effects; and (7)
the relative importance of the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad. See Reebok Int'l, 970 F.2d at 554-55 (quoting Timberlane,
549 F.2d at 614); see also Erika M. Brown, The ExtraterritorialReach of United States
Trademark Law: A Review of Recent Decisions under the Lanham Act, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 863, 875-79 (1999) (reviewing decisions from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
70. See, e.g., Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.
1983) (embracing the Vanity Fairthree-factor test with slight modifications that the effect
on United States commerce needs only be "more than insignificant" and the three factors
serve as the primary basis, not the exclusive basis for the analysis). The American Rice
court found all three factors present for the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.
Id. at 414-16. The defendant was an Arkansas company, satisfying the citizenship
requirement. Id. at 414. The defendant processed, packaged and transported the
infringing products within the United States, satisfying the "more than insignificant" effect
on United States commerce. Id. Lastly, there was no conflict with foreign law because the
defendant did not have trademark rights under Saudi Arabian law. Id. at 415; see also
Brown, supra note 69, at 881-83 (reviewing cases from various circuit courts that adopted
different tests to determine whether to extend the jurisdictional reach of the Lanham Act).
Though the Vanity Fair Mills test is the most restrictive compared to tests employed by
other circuits, recent decisions rendered by the Second Circuit appear to erode the
disparity among the tests. See Brown, supra note 69, at 884. Consequently, U.S. corporate
plaintiffs can expect to receive protection for their trademarks against infringement
occurring outside the United States on the basis of the increasingly liberal extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act by the circuit courts. Id. at 865.
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Three common requirements emerge from the plethora of tests
the circuit courts employ to examine jurisdictional reach of Lanham
Act claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition
occurring in foreign nations.7 1 The first asks whether the defendant's
activities in the foreign country have a significant affect on United
States commerce.72 The second requirement considers the citizenship
of the defendant; extending the reach of the Lanham Act if the
defendant is either a citizen or a corporation of the United States,73
or, though not a United States citizen or corporation, the defendant
resides in the United States and is able to control the infringing
conduct occurring in the foreign nation.74 The second requirement is
not met, however, where the defendant is a foreign citizen (whether a
natural person or corporation), the defendant uses the plaintiff's
trademark in a foreign nation, and such use of the trademark, though
deemed unlawful under U.S. law, is permissible under the law of the
foreign nation. In this scenario, the foreign citizen is neither a U.S.
citizen nor has substantial contacts with the United States to establish
constructive U.S. citizenship. Between Bulova and the enactment of
the digital trademark right, courts applied the Lanham Act in
extraterritorial trademark disputes only when the defendants were
United States citizens or had substantial contacts with the United
States.75 The last requirement examines the degree of conflict with
foreign law, if the Lanham Act is applied extraterritorially.76
71. See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994)
(noting that lower federal courts have deducted a general rule derived from Bulova).
72. See id.; Am. Rice, 701 F.2d at 414-16.
73. Compare Reebok Int'l, 970 F.2d at 554-55 (defendant Betech was a U.S.
corporation), Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1991)
(defendant was a California corporation), Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769
F.2d 1393, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant was a California corporation), with Nintendo,

34 F.3d at 251 (reversing the lower court and remanding the case where the district court
failed to consider the citizenship of the defendant and the degree of conflict in legal
requirements), Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colbrone, 14 F.3d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling

that none of the defendants were American citizens and thus "this case does not implicate
the United States' broad power to regulate the conduct of its citizens in foreign
countries"), Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1956) (ruling that
the district court's decision in declining subject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act
was proper in a case where the defendant was a Canadian company with an office in New

York, but all employees in New York had no control over the defendant, and the
defendant had a valid trademark right in Canada).

74. See Calvin Klein Indus., Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78, 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the defendant had constructive U.S. citizenship under the
Vanity Fairtest).

75. See supra note 65.
76. See Reebok Int'l, 970 F.2d at 555-56 (noting that the defendant Betech had no
trademark in Mexico and consequently, there was no conflict of law); Am. Rice, 701 F.2d
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Courts also apply the same three requirements in determining
whether an injunction prohibiting extraterritorial conduct in violation
of the federal trademark law is warranted.77 In Nintendo of America,
Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., for example, the Fourth Circuit vacated a
district court's injunction enjoining extraterritorial conduct and ruled
that
[w]hile a court may issue an injunction having
extraterritorial effect in order to prevent trademark
violations under the Lanham Act, it should do so only where
the extraterritorial conduct would, if not enjoined, have a
significant effect on United States commerce, and then only
after consideration of the extent to which the citizenship of
the defendant, and the possibility of conflict with trademark
rights under the relevant foreign law might make issuance of
the injunction
inappropriate in light of international comity
78
concerns.
In that case, the defendant challenged the extraterritorial reach
of the injunctive decree. The district court found that defendant's
goods, sold to customers in Mexico and Canada, subsequently
entered U.S. commerce and, therefore, the court concluded that the
defendant's sales of infringing cartridges had a significant impact on
U.S. commerce.79 The district court concluded that the plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction whose scope was "sufficiently broad to
include actions taken outside the United States which have a
significant impact on United States commerce."8 The terms of the
injunction, however, broadly prohibited the defendants from
infringing the plaintiff's trademarks in the United States, Canada, and

at 415-16 (finding that there was no conflict of law because the defendant did not hold a
Saudi Arabian trademark); Warnaco, Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940, 952 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (recognizing no conflict of law because plaintiff held the foreign trademark rights);
Calvin Klein, 714 F. Supp. at 80 (finding no conflict of trademark law because the
defendant possessed no foreign trademark rights in the trademarks).
77. See Nintendo, 34 F.3d at 250 (ruling that the three factors under Bulova must be
analyzed when issuing an injunction enjoining extraterritorial conduct); Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 748-50 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding the district court's injunction
enjoining the defendant's extraterritorial conduct was too broad); Star-Kist Foods, 769
F.2d at 1393 (affirming the district court's injunction against the defendant from using
plaintiff's trademarks on canned fish exported from the United States to other countries
where defendant had no trademark rights).
78. See Nintendo, 34 F.3d at 250.
79. See id. at 249.
80. Id.
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Mexico.8 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration
in accordance with its ruling.82
Despite traditional limits on the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
trademark law, federal trademark law recently has undergone some
major developments in response to the recent growth of
communications, transactions and commerce conducted through the
global, networked, electronic medium of the Internet. These new
legal developments-in particular, the creation of the ACPA's new

digital trademark right-expand the extraterritorial reach of the
federal trademark law, impermissibly, beyond the limitations under
Bulova.

II.

THE BORDERLESS ELECTRONIC CHALLENGE: DOMAIN NAMES

VS. TRADEMARK RIGHTS

The development of networked computers and Internet-related
technology has allowed and continues to encourage the rapid growth
of electronic communications, transactions, and commerce.83 Such
growth erodes the physical boundaries of nations and creates many

unanticipated challenges to the legitimacy of national law where it
reaches

extraterritorially

through

electronic

means.84

These

challenges begin with the most basic element of Internet
communication-domain names.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 252.
83. See generally Sung In, Death of a Trademark: Genericide in the Digital Age, 21
REV. LITIG. 159, 178-79 (2002) (stating that gross Internet sales are expected to reach
between 34 and 37.5 billion dollars in 2002 and the growth of Internet users is projected to
be one billion total in the next four years); Richard Warner, Border Disputes: Trespass to
Chattels on the Internet,47 VILL. L. REV. 117, 119 (2002) (noting the low cost of electronic
communication and the ease of access to online information facilitates the rapid growth of
electronic commerce).
The Internet allows people to maintain a banking account,
purchase airline tickets, order groceries, purchase clothing, shop for automobiles and
obtain professional degrees. Id. at 179. Taking advantage of the online medium and the
increase in speed and quality of communications, Internet companies engage in various
models of business to reach consumers. Id.; Gregory Shea, Note, Trademarks and
Keyword Banner Advertising, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 532 (2002) (discussing online
advertising through banners to target certain demographic online consumers).
84. See generally infra Section V (describing the collision between national and
international law in cyberspace).
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Domain Names

Domain names are assigned on a first-come, first-serve basis.85
The registrant first represents to the registrar that the requested
domain name does not infringe on others' rights.86 The registrar does
not verify the registrant's assertion, however.87 The domain name
registration procedure facilitates the swift processing of domain name
registration requests, usually in a matter of a few minutes at the
registrar's web site.88 This procedure also permits low cost domain
name registration. 89

Each domain name consists of a combination of a Top Level
Domain ("TLD") and Second Level Domain ("SLD").90 Domain
85. See Michael Tanner, Trademarks, Internet Domain Names, and the NSI: How Do
We Fix a System That is Already Broken?, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y, 1, 18-21 (1998)
(explaining the domain name registration system).
To obtain a domain name, an individual or entity files an application with
Network Solutions listing the domain name the applicant wants. Because each
web page must have an unique domain name, Network Solution checks to see
whether the requested domain name has already been assigned to someone else.
If so, the applicant must choose a different domain name.
Brookfield Communication, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir.
1999). See generally Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,
953 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (explaining the domain name registration procedure).
86. See VERISIGN, SERVICE AGREEMENT 117, at http://www.networksolutions.com/
enUS/legal/service-agreement.jhtml (last visited on Sept. 12, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (detailing the domain name owner's representations and
warranties).
87. See Tanner, supra note 85, at 20; Oliver R. Gutierrez, Comment, Get Off My
URL! Congress Outlaws Cybersquatting in the Wild West of the Internet, 17 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 148 (2000); David B. Nash, Comment,

Orderly Expansion of the InternationalTop-Level Domains: Concurrent Trademark Users
Need a Way Out of the Internet Trademark Quagmire, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 521, 537-39 (1997); see also Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273
F.3d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the "domain name registration system is a nongovernmentally operated, first-come, first-served system that does not inquire into
potential conflicts with trademarks"); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202
F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting the "lack of any regulatory control over domain name
registration"); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044 (noting that NSI "does not make an
independent determination about a registrant's right to use a particular domain name");
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that NSI
does not make any inquiry to ascertain whether the registrant's domain name is infringing
any trademarks).
88. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 850 (E.D. Va. 2000) (noting
that the registration cost is only $35 per year and "the registration process occurred
entirely online, by way of NSI's web site, and lasted no more than a few minutes").
89. See Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1162 n.4 & n.5 (W.D.
Ala. 2001) (noting NSI's registration fee is $35 per year and other registrars' annual
registration fees range from $8.95 to $30).
90. See Tamar Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker in Cyberspace: A Power Model, 27
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 859, 870-72 (2002) (explaining the structure of naming in cyberspace
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names are unique, meaning that no two identical domain names exist
in cyberspace.9 1 To be more precise, no two SLDs exist in the same
TLD.92 Indeed, a domain name registrar will assign a domain name in
a particular TLD only after a search for the proposed domain name in
the database of registered domain names in the TLD reveals a
negative result.93 If the desired domain name is available, the
applicant can register the domain name.94 If the desired domain
name is not available, the applicant can modify the domain name
slightly for resubmission or obtain the desired domain name in
another TLD that is still available.95
Domain names serve as the alphabetical representations, most
often in easily recognizable words and phrases, of Internet Protocol
("IP") addresses. Each entity connected to the Internet needs an IP
address, consisting of a string of numbers readable by computers.96
For the ease of human use, domain names are created whereby the

and the uniqueness of domain names in cyberspace); Tanner, supra note 85, at 18-21
(explaining the Internet Domain Name Registration system); see also Name.space, Inc. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining the Internet
Domain Name Registration system). Common examples of TLDs include .com, .org, and
.net.
91. See generally Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044 (explaining the anatomy of domain
names); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, THE RECOGNITION OF
RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM: REPORT
OF
THE
SECOND
WIPO
INTERNET
DOMAIN
NAME
PROCESS
12,
at

http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/pdf/report.pdf (Sept. 3, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) ("To remain a global network, the Internet requires the existence
of a globally unique public name space."); Developments in the Law-The Law of
Cyberspace, The Domain Name System: A Case Study of the Significance of Norms To
Internet Governance, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1657 (1999) (outlining the problems in the
current system governing domain name registration).
92. See Frankel, supra note 90, at 871-72 (discussing the single root zone system of
controlling and assigning domain names for the purpose of ensuring each domain name is
unique); see also Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (discussing the process through which
registrars ensure that only one particular SLD is registered within a TLD).
93. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
94. See Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
95. See id.
96. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741, 31741
(1998); Name.space, Inc. v. Network Solution, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 2000) ("An
IP address is a string of four sets of numbers, separated by periods, such as '98.37.241.30,'
and every host or computer on the Internet is assigned such a numerical IP address."). See
generally Jonathan M. Ward, The Rise and Fall of Internet Fences: The Overbroad
Protection of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 211, 212-14 (2001) (providing an overview of the Internet and the Domain Name
System).
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alpha-numeric character strings correspond to IP addresses.97 The
ease of human use, however, clashes with potential human abuse
because domain names also serve as a source identification for online
companies.98 Because there is no limitation on the quantity of
domain names that an entity or individual can register, a registrantconstrained only by its ability to pay-can obtain as many domain
name registrations as it desires.9 9 Theoretically, a registrant could
hold hundreds of valid trademarks hostage by registering domain
names that are identical
or similar to established trademarks before
100
the trademark owner.

97. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET
NAMES AND ADDRESSES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES-FINAL REPORT OF THE
WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS (April 30, 1999), at http://wipo2.wipo.int/
processl/report/finalreport.htmI (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating
that the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense and its
contractors developed a Domain Name System whereby a host would be assigned a
"human-friendly address ... in a form that is easy to remember or to identify" to
correspond to the host's Internet Protocol alpha numeric number); see also Stuart A.
Weinstein, The Cyberpiracy Prevention Act:
Reconciling Real Space Sectoral and
GeographicDistinctions in the Use of Internet Domain Names under the Lanham Act, 9 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 145, 146 (2001) (stating domain names are "the human friendly
equivalent of Internet Protocol Addresses that permit easy navigation across the expanse
of the Internet").
98. See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001)
(noting that "[blecause of their easily remembered form, domain names have become
business identifiers important to offering goods and services on the Internet"); see also
Dale M. Cendali, Legal Developments in Trademark Law and the Internet, 661 PLI/PAT
259, 263-67 (2001) (identifying different types of unauthorized registrations of trademarks
as domain names); Mark V.B. Partridge, The Internet Domain Name System: Recent
InternationalDevelopments, 558 PLI/PAT 55, 76 (1999) (discussing the interface between
domain names and trademarks that while domain names were originally intended to
perform only technical functions, they have become business identifiers due to their easy
to remember and human friendly form).
99. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1999)
(stating the defendant has registered thousands of common surnames, hobbies, careers,
pets, sports interests, favorite music, and the like as domain names in the .net, .org, and
.com Top Level Domains); Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d
658, 658 (E.D. Va. 2001) (recognizing that the Argentinean registrant had registered
nearly 300 domain names incorporating the trademark owner's mark).
100. See, e.g., Harrods,157 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (noting that the registrant had registered
domain names incorporating the trademark owner's mark without permission); Porsche
Cars N. Am. Inc. v. Porsch.com, et. al., 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding
that 128 domain names incorporating the trademark PORSCHE were registered without
authorization from the trademark owner), vacated and remanded, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir.
2000) (unpublished opinion); see also S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5 (1999) (Su. Doc. No.
Y1.1/5:106-140) (stating that Warner Bros. was asked to pay $350,000 for the rights to the
names warner-records.com, warner-bros-records.com, warner-pictures.com, warner-brospictures.com, and warnerpictures.com).
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Moreover, because the Internet has become an attractive
medium for global commerce, °1 some domain names are considered
to be extremely valuable. 0 2 These factors drive the scarcity of
domain names and create a growing secondary market for domain
names. °3 Owning a domain name is often considered similar to
"owning" a globally accessible telephone number.0 4 Ownership has
the potential for commercial exploits that may generate high
monetary value for the domain name registrant.' Thus, the value of
the domain name depends on how it is used in association with the
goods, services, and contents provided at a web site by the registrant
or party who has the right to use it.0 6 In addition, due to the global
accessibility of the Internet and the way in which Internet users
search for online products or services, many domain names are now
considered valuable assets irrespective of any goodwill attached to
the domain names.0 7 These domain names are being sold at high
101. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 20 ("In the past, confusingly similar trademarks could exist
simultaneously in different geographical areas or in different business sectors without
creating consumer confusion. The Internet has drastically changed this situation because a
domain name is both unique and global in scope.").
102. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides With Cyberspace: Insecurity
Interests in the New Corporate Assets, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37, 59-62 (forthcoming
2002) (discussing domain names as valuable corporate assets).
103. See id. at 59-62 (discussing the secondary market for domain names and methods
of valuing domain names).
104. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998)
(comparing domain name to 1-800-HOLIDAY); Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561
(E.D. Va. 1999) (analogizing domain names to telephone numbers); Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957-58 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (analogizing
domain names function similar to telephone numbers). But see Name.Space, Inc. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584-85 (2d Cir. 2000) (warning against the adoption
of the analogy between domain names and telephone number mnemonics because "the
nature of domain names is not susceptible to such a uniform, monolithic characterization
[and it is] 'unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of
words now' ").

105. In Lockheed Martin, the court noted that:
Domain names, like telephone numbers, are also valuable to trademark holders
when they make it easier for customers to find the trademark holder. Where the
holder of a vanity telephone number promotes it in a way that causes a likelihood
of confusion, the holder has engaged in an infringing use.
985 F. Supp. at 958; see also Richard D. Harris, Trademark and Copyright Law on the
World Wide Web: A Survey of the Wild Frontier, 588 PLI/PAT 553, 560 (2000) ("[A]
domain name is the Internet's equivalent of a vanity telephone number.").
106. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561; Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 957 ("A tollfree telephone number with an easy-to-remember letter equivalent is a valuable business
asset.").
107. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (noting that unlike trademarks, which are
valuable because of their associated goodwill, many domain names comprised of generic
and common words are nevertheless valuable because Internet users most likely use
generic or common words to search for products or services at a particular Internet search
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prices in the open market apart from their web contents or
goodwill." 8 These domain names often are generic, short, memorable
words.0 9 They are sometimes the generic names of products or
services. The more generic a domain name, the higher price it
enjoys.110 Some Internet companies, for example, use generic, short,
memorable domain names as their source identifiers."

engine); Michael V. LiRocchi et al., Trademarks and Internet Domain Names in the Digital
Millennium, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 377, 384-85 (1999-2000) (comparing
the roles of trademarks and domain names in cyberspace); J. Thomas McCarthy,
Trademarks, Cybersquattersand Domain Names, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL'Y 231, 238-45 (2000) (discussing how domain names function as trademarks and
cause trademark infringement in the Internet); Donna L. Howard, Note, Trademarks &
Service Marks and Internet Domain Names? Giving ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
637, 641-42 (2001) (discussing the role of trademarks in domain names).
108. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (discussing the value of domain names,
irrespective of the goodwill or web contents).
109. See generally David Yan, Virtual Reality: Can We Ride Trademark Law to Surf
Cyberspace?, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 773, 871 (2000) (stating
that "a memorable, easy-to-spell domain name is more valuable than diamonds"). As
recent examples of this phenomenon, the Business.com domain name was sold for $7.5
million, korea.com for $5.5 million, loans.com at $3.0 million, and auto.com for $2.2
million. Greg Johnson, The Costly Game for Net Names, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at Al
(reporting on domain names and listing the prices of some generic, short, and memorable
domain names-including Business.com).
110. See David Streitfeld, On the Web, Simplest Names Can Become PriciestAddresses,
WASH. POST, July 15, 1999, at Al; see also Dorer,60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 ("A domain name
with significant value on the open market certainly would be an attractive, arguably
appropriate target for a judgment creditor seeking to satisfy a judgment from a wayward
debtor.").
111. As one commentator noted:
Now that so much business is conducted on the Web, a memorable domain name
can itself translate into valuable consumer recognition and revenue growth. The
relative ease of creating a domain name that can attract Web-browsers has led to
the creation of a market for domain names, with some domain names selling for
more than a million dollars.
Thomas C. Grimm et al., Trademarks in Cyberspace, 18 DEL. LAW. 23, 24 (2000); see also
Stacy B. Sterling, New Age Bandits in Cyberspace: Domain Names Held Hostage on the
Internet, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 733, 735 (1997) ("Not surprisingly, many businesses,
when choosing a domain name, select words or names that are easy for customers to
remember and that are common words or well-known trade names."). Bank of America,
for example, purchased the domain name loans.com for $3.0 million because the domain
name received three to four thousand hits per day even though there was no associated
active website with the domain name. Daniel Joelson, Banks Square Off Over Internet
Domain Names: Financial Institutions Take Cyber-squatters and Slanderers to Court,
Vol.13, No. 12, BANK TECH. NEWS, Dec. 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 17153605 (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting e-commerce branding by the use of
generic, short, memorable domain names as source identifiers); Johnson, supra note 109
(reporting Internet companies' willingness to purchase memorable domain names as part
of Internet branding to offset advertising costs).
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B. Application of the Lanham Act to Domain Names
The Lanham Act does not afford trademark protection to
generic names, even though they may serve as source identifiers." 2
The Act protects valid trademarks, prohibiting the use of an identical
or similar name that is infringing a valid trademark, causing a
likelihood of confusion in the mind of the consumer.1 3 The source
identification quality of a name is therefore within the provenance of
the Lanham Act.'14

To avoid potential liability under the Lanham Act, a domain
name registrant can take advantage of the Internet's anonymity by
providing false name and contact information to the domain name
registrar."5 It would be difficult in such cases for a trademark owner
to ascertain the true identity of the registrant for jurisdictional

purposes and to find the registrant for service of process." 6
112. See Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (1st Cir. 1980) (ruling
no trademark protection for a generic term that has acquired secondary meaning
associating it with a particular producer); CES Publ'g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ'n Inc., 531
F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975) (reiterating the well-established rule that generic terms are not
protected under the law even though the terms have acquired secondary meaning); see
also Ale House Mgmt. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 2000) (ruling
that the Lanham Act's prohibition on unfair competition does not protect generic
trademarks).
113. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (explaining
that trademark law protects consumers from a likelihood of confusion as to the source of
products and assures trademark holders reap the financial, reputation-related rewards of
their products bearing the trademark).
114. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 5, at 5-1 to 5-21 (analyzing the
history of trademarks, trademark law, and the Lanham Act along with its legislative
intent).
115. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999) ("[C]ybersquatters have become increasingly
sophisticated as the case law has developed and now take the necessary precautions to
insulate themselves from liability.").
116. See id. at 10 ("A significant problem faced by trademark owners in the fight
against cybersquatting is the fact that many cybersquatters register domain names under
alias or otherwise provide false information in their registration applications in order to
avoid identification and service of process by the mark owner."). Internet anonymity
refers to the ease of disguising one's identity in the vast electronic communication
network. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability, 104 YALE
L.J. 1639, 1641-43 (1995) (discussing true anonymity and Internet anonymity). Indeed, as
noted by a commentator, "[a]nonymity can be generated by Internet users quite readily,
given that a user's computer address may be altered and a user's name may be changed or
masked." Charles R. Topping, The Surf is Up, But Who Owns the Beach? Who Should
Regulate Commerce on the Internet?, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 179,
187 (1999). With regard to domain name registrations, a domain name registrant can
remain anonymous by submitting an alias and a false address to a registrar at the time of
registration for a domain name. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10. As a result, a trademark
owner could not locate the domain name registrant for purposes of resolving a domain
name registration problem through amiable means or litigation. See id.
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Moreover, any person residing anywhere can register and gain access
to a domain name if that person has an Internet connection."' Faced
with the challenges to trademark jurisprudence presented by the
global nature of the Internet, Congress recently acted to extend U.S.
trademark rights beyond the territorial borders of the United
States.' 18
III. DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO THE ELECTRONIC BORDERLESS
CHALLENGE: NATIONAL DIGITAL TRADEMARK RIGHT

Given the rapid growth" 9 of borderless, electronic commerce,
trademark owners faced the costly problem of cybersquatting when
they attempted to expand their business online. 120 Registration of a
117. See, e.g., Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 658
(E.D. Va. 2001) (registrant located in Argentina); Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A v.
Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 342 (E.D. Va. 2001) (registrants located in the
Dominican Republic); V'soske, Inc. v. Vsoske.com, No. 00 Civ. 6099, 2001 WL 546567, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001) (registrants located in Ireland);, Broadbridge Media v.
Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (registrant located in Canada).
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2000) (in rem provision).
119. The rapid and continued growth of e-commerce is evidenced by the creation of
more than thirty-six million web sites by the end of December, 2001. One year earlier,
there were only twenty-five million web sites, and five years ago fewer than one million
web sites.

See HOBBES' INTERNET TIMELINE v5.6, at http://www.zakon.org/robert/

internet/timeline/ (last modified April 1, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). According to the data released by the United States Department of Commerce
on November 28, 2001, retail e-commerce sales in third quarter 2001 were $7.5 billion, up
8.3% from third quarter 2000. U.S. Census Bureau, Retail E-Commerce Sales in Third
Quarter 2001 Were $7.5 Billion, Up 8.3 Percentfrom Third Quarter 2000, Census Bureau
Reports, UNITED STATES COMMERCE NEWS, available at http://www.census.gov/mrts/
www/current.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The figure does not include sales generated by companies in non-retail
operation such as travel agencies, financial services, manufacturers, and wholesalers. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SERVICE SECTOR STATISTICS:

E-COMMERCE FREQUENTLY

ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ), at http://www.census.gov/mrts/www.efaq.html (last modified
May 28, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
120. Recognizing the harms of cybersquatting, the Senate remarked that:
The practice of cybersquatting harms consumers, electronic commerce, and the
goodwill equity of valuable U.S. brand names, upon which consumers
increasingly rely to locate the true source of genuine goods and services on the
Internet. Online consumers have a difficult time distinguishing a genuine site
from a pirate site, given that often the only indications of source and authenticity
of the site, or the goods and services made available thereon, are the graphical
interface on the site itself and the Internet address at which it resides. As a
result, consumers have come to rely heavily on familiar brand names when
engaging in online commerce. But if someone is operating a website under
another brand owner's trademark, such as a site called "cocacola.com" or
"levis.com," consumers bear a significant risk of being deceived and defrauded,
or at a minimum, confused. The costs associated with these risks are increasingly
burdensome as more people begin selling pharmaceuticals, financial services, and
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trademark as a domain name without the authorization of the owner
was a, profitable opportunity, seizing a high return on a small
investment of the domain name registration fees.121
A.

The Limited Protection of Trademarks in Cyberspace Priorto the
ACPA

Looking to the then-existing law for assistance, trademark
owners discovered that existing law failed to address the new digital
technological medium.122 For example, under a federal unfair
competition claim, trademark infringement and trademark dilution
statutes require the trademark owner to prove that the defendant
uses the domain name in commerce.'23 In the borderless, electronic
commerce context, a potential defendant can avoid liability by not

even groceries over the Internet. Regardless of what is being sold, the result of
online brand name abuse, as with other forms of trademark violations, is the
erosion of consumer confidence in brand name identifiers and in electronic
commerce generally.
S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5 (1999).
121. See id. (noting testimony regarding cybersquatters selling domain names
incorporating valid trademarks at high prices at various web sites).
122. Indeed, the Senate expressed its view on this issue:
While the Federal Trademark Dilution Act has been useful in pursuing
cybersquatters, cybersquatters have become increasingly sophisticated as the
case law has developed and now take the necessary precautions to insulate
themselves from liability. For example, many cybersquatters are now careful to
no longer offer the domain name for sale in any manner that could implicate
liability under existing trademark dilution case law. And, in cases of
warehousing and trafficking in domain names, courts have sometimes declined to
provide assistance to trademark holders, leaving them without adequate and
effective judicial remedies.
This uncertainty as to the trademark law's
application to the Internet has produced inconsistent judicial decisions and
created extensive monitoring obligations, unnecessary legal costs, and
uncertainty for consumers and trademark owners alike.
Id. at 7; Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that Congress passed the ACPA in response to a lack of adequate judicial
remedies (quoting S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7)).
123. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling
that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires the defendant to be using the
trademark in commerce). In Avery, the court held that the defendant's registration of
common surnames did not constitute commercial use. Id. The defendant merely used
words "that happen to be trademarks for their non-trademark values." Id.; see, e.g., Watts
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 276 (Table), No. IP 98-1529-C-H/G, 1999 WL 994012,
at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 1999) (ruling that no infringement could occur where disputed
domain name had not been used in connection with sale of goods or services on the
Internet); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Registration of a trademark as a domain name,
without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not within the
prohibitions of the [Federal Trademark Dilution Act].").
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"using" the domain name.24 The potential defendant may hide
behind her mere registration of the domain name, as such activity
alone does not amount to trademark use in commerce. 2 Further,
though a claim under the federal trademark dilution statute does not
require proof of defendant's use that is causing a likelihood of
confusion,126 a trademark dilution claim is generally not viable
because few trademarks are qualified for the protection under the
federal trademark dilution statute.12
The dilution statute affords
broad protection only to trademarks that are truly famous 128 or
famous and distinctive.2 9
Moreover, the owner of a famous
trademark faces another mountainous hurdle from rulings in some

124. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 655 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (ruling that "neither registering, nor warehousing, nor trafficking in a domain
name that incorporates a protected trademark, is alone sufficient to support claims of
infringement or dilution"); Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp.
684, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("The mere 'warehousing' of the domain name is not enough to
find that defendant placed the mark on goods or [services] as required.").
125. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956
n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that the registration of a domain name with a registrar for use
on the Internet, without more, is not a commercial use of the domain name as a trademark
under the Lanham Act); see also Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't Corp.,
174 F.3d 136, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling that the district court's recognition that mere
registration of domain name does not constitute use under the Lanham Act was correct,
but nevertheless concluded that the district court's analysis that "registration of a domain
name with the intent to use it commercially was sufficient to convey trademark rights"
contradicted established law that trademark rights are not conveyed through mere intent
to use a mark commercially).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining 'dilution' for purposes of the Lanham Act);
Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875 ("In the dilution context, likelihood of confusion is
irrelevant.").
127. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875 (ruling that to meet the famousness element
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a mark must be truly prominent and renowned).
This means famousness "requires a showing greater than mere distinctiveness." Id. at 877.
The plaintiff's trademarks acquired only secondary meanings, and thus failed to meet the
famousness prong. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuringand
Proving Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV.
201, 209-12 (1999) (analyzing the ambiguity of the famousness statutory requirement);
Jerry B. Swann, Dilution Redefined For The Year 2000, 37 Hous. L. REV. 729, 760-64
(2000) (analyzing factors for marks to qualify for current dilution protection).
128. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157,
167 (3d Cir. 2000) (famous trademarks); Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 874 (famous
trademarks); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (famous
trademarks).
129. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,216 (2d Cir. 1999) (famous
and distinctive trademarks); see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Blame It on the Cybersquatters:
How Congress Partially Ends the Circus Among the Circuits with the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 777, 782-88 (2001) (analyzing the
conflicting rulings among federal circuit courts on fame and distinctiveness as statutory
elements).
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circuit courts requiring proof of actual dilutive harm 3 ' or likelihood

of dilutive harm to the famous trademark due to the defendant's use
of the junior trademark."'
B.

A CPA-Arming Trademark Owners with a New "Digital
TrademarkRight"

1. In Personam Jurisdiction
Benefiting from the lack of legislation addressing abusive domain
name registrations, persons or entities located outside the reach of
U.S. courts can obtain domain names from a registrar in the United
States.'32

With the click of a mouse, a person establishes digital

contact with a domain name registrar.'33 That person can register a
domain name without travelling to the United States for the
transaction or physically sending documentation for the registration
transaction to the domain name registrar.'34 The ease of borderless,

electronic commerce through a vast network of computers, however,
has its own cost. If the foreign registrant registered a domain name
that is similar to a federally registered trademark in the United States
130. See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670-71
(5th Cir. 2000) (requiring proof of actual dilution); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999)
(same). For an analysis of the split among the circuit courts on "dilution," see Nguyen,
supra note 129, at 788-92. A junior trademark is causing dilutive harm to a famous senior
trademark if the use of the junior trademark in commerce lessens "the capacity of the
famous trademark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence
or absence of ...(1) competition between the owner of the famous trademark and other
parties, or ...(2) the likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2000). Essentially, the junior trademark lessens the distinctive quality of the famous
trademark. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 874-75 (defining dilution). For example,
"Victor's Secret" and "Victor's Little Secret" trademarks in connection with an adult
specialty store have been held as causing dilutive harm to the famous VICTORIA'S
SECRET trademark. V Secret Catalogue Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir.
2001), cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 1536 (2002).
131. See, e.g., Times MirrorMagazines, 212 F.3d at 168 (requiring proof of a likelihood
of dilution); Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217-22 (same). See generally Seth Aaron Rose, Towards
a Solution for Dilution: Likelihood Instead of Actual Harm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1869 (2001)
(analyzing the likelihood of dilution standard and concluding that such a standard is
practical).
132. See, e.g., Hartog & Co. v. Swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(noting that the registrant located in Zurich, Switzerland had only a registration contact
with NSI); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 522 (E.D. Va.
2000) (noting that the Mexican corporation registered domain names with United States
registrar, NSI).
133. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Huanh, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 850 (E.D. Va. 2000) (noting
registration of a domain name is entirely online at a registrar's web site).
134. See id. at 855.
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for a bad faith purpose, the owner of the trademark cannot assert an
action against the foreign registrant in the United States. 135 There is
no in personam jurisdiction over the foreign registrant. 36
The U.S. government responded to the cybersquatting problem
in electronic commerce with the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA"). The ACPA became effective as of
November 29, 1999, and provides broad remedies to trademark
owners, including an in rem action in cases where the courts lack in
personam jurisdiction over the foreign registrant. 17
2. No Contacts, No Problem-In Rem Jurisdiction
The ACPA became the new, favorite legal tool for trademark
owners 138 combating the registration of, trafficking in,139 or use of a
135. See id. at 856 (ruling neither the circumstances of the domain name registration
contracts' execution or negotiation, nor the relationship of the domain registration
contracts to the State of Virginia are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over
foreign registrant); see also William H. Brewster et. al., Resolving the Clash Between
Trademarks and Domain Names, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 88-89 (stating that the act
of domain name registration alone does not subject the registrant to jurisdiction of the
forum state).
136. See Am. Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d. at 859; Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v.
Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d. 505, 506 (recognizing an in rem action against domain
name hypercd.com because the registrant is a citizen of British Columbia, Canada); S.
REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999). Even if a foreign party has an interactive web site, there is
still no personal jurisdiction over the foreign party when that party has not intentionally
targeted or has not interacted with consumers in the forum state. See iAccess Inc. v.
WEBcard Techs. Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1189 (D. Utah 2002) (finding a lack of specific
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who operates a moderately interactive
website).
137. On June 21, 1999, Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI) introduced the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. S. 1255, 106th Cong. (1999); see S. REP.
No. 106-140, at 4 (recounting the legislative history of the. ACPA). On July 29, 1999,
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) introduced the Domain Name Piracy Prevention Act of
1999. S. 1462, 106th Cong. (1999); see S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (same). On August 5,
1999, the Senate passed S. 1255 and amended it to incorporate S. 1462. See S. 1255; S.
REP. No. 106-140, at 4. On October 26, 1999, an amended version of that bill passed the
House in lieu of the House's own version that was introduced earlier by Representative
James Rogan (R-CA). H.R. 3028, 106th Cong. (1999); see H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 1, 4
(1999) (recounting the legislative history of the Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act).
Congress then incorporated the legislation into its omnibus spending bill. See H.R. 3194,
106th Cong. (1999); see H.R. REP. No. 106-1047 (2001), 2001 WL 29442, at *45 (stating
that H.R. 3028 and S. 1255 were incorporated into the omnibus spending bill). President
Clinton signed the bill into law on November 29, 1999. Trademark Cyberpiracy
Prevention, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1501A-545, 1501A-552 (1999); see S.
REP. No. 106-140, at 4.
138. As trademark owners brought actions under the ACPA immediately after it
became law, courts welcomed the statute as "a particularly good fit" with cybersquatting
cases that were previously brought under the federal trademark dilution statute. For
example, the Second Circuit directly applied the ACPA without a remand in a case where
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domain name with bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a
distinctive or famous mark. 4 °
The ACPA provides in rem
jurisdiction over domain names in cases where in personam
jurisdiction over the registrant is not available or where the registrant
could not be found after a due diligence search.141 Because the digital
contact between the foreign registrant and the forum is insufficient to
establish minimum contact under the law, the in rem provision
provides an alternative means for a trademark owner to resolve the
the ACPA was passed while the case was on appeal. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v.
Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Virtual Works, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2001.) (affirming violation of the
ACPA in a case where the defendant registered and used the domain name legitimately at
first, then trafficked the domain name later in bad faith). See generally M. Flynn Justice,
Emerging Internet Law Issues, in 1230 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE-ADVANCED CORPORATE WORKSHOP 2001 123, 140 (2001) (noting that
trademark owners have gained two powerful tools to combat cybersquatting activities:
ACPA and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy mandated by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers).
139. "Traffics in" refers to transactions that include "sales, purchases, loans, pledges,
license, exchanges or currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in
exchange for consideration." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(E) (2000).
140. See § 1125(d)(1)(A). This provision is often referred to as section 43(d) of the
Lanham Act, which provides:
A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard
to the goods or services of the parties, that person(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of
the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark ....
141. See § 1125(d)(2)(A):
The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the
judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or
other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is
located if
(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the
Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c), and
(ii) the court finds that the owner(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would
have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have
been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed
under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal
and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and
publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after
filing the action.
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unauthorized registration of its trademark as a domain name in a
federal court. 4 2 Trademark owners can initiate in rem action against
143
the domain name, not its registrant or owner.

In addition to alleviating the hurdle of in personam jurisdiction,
plaintiffs may desire to sue under the ACPA because the in rem
action is both time and cost effective.'"
In exchange for such

advantages, the trademark owner may not recover damages or
attorneys' fees.'45 The trademark owner is also limited to having the
domain name transferred to it or obtaining a cancellation or
forfeiture of the domain name, provided that the trademark owner
successfully demonstrates that the domain name violates any right of

the owner of its trademarks registered in the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, 146 or the trademark owner successfully

establishes that the domain name violates any rights of the owner
protected under the trademark unfair competition
48
dilution statutes.

47

and trademark

142. See Shri Ram Chandra Mission v. Sahajmarg.org, 139 F. Supp. 2d 721, 722 (E.D
Va. 2001) (allowing in rem action against a domain name after dismissing the original
action brought by the plaintiff due to lack of in personam jurisdiction against the alleged
registrant of the domain name in dispute).
143. See, e.g., Lisa M. Sharrock, The Future of Domain Name Dispute Resolution:
Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions from Within the UDRP Framework, 51
DUKE L.J. 817, 824-28 (2001) (discussing the implications of confirming in rem
jurisdiction over the domain name itself, rather than over the registrant).
144. See generally Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860,
863 (E.D. Va. 2000) (noting that in rem actions are quick and relatively inexpensive).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) (providing limited remedies for in rem actions).
The remedies are "limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain
name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark." Id. On the other
hand, remedies under in personam actions are much broader. Section 35 of the Lanham
Act was amended to include a new provision on statutory damages for in personam
actions:
(d) In a case involving a violation of section [43(d)(1)], the plaintiff may elect, at
any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead
of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of
not less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court
considers just.
15 U.S.C. § 1117(d); see also Aztar Corp. v. MGM Casino, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1460, 1466 (E.D.
Va. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (ordering the defendant to pay $100,000 in statutory
damages for an ACPA violation and, in addition, attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiff).
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (establishing that a trademark owner may file an
in rem action if "the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office").
147. See § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (establishing that a trademark owner may bring an in rem
action if "the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark ... protected under
subsection (a)"); see also Cable News Network L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506,
515 (E.D. Va. 2001) (ruling that one way to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in
an ACPA in rem action is for the plaintiff to establish each of the elements of trademark

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

C. Application of the A CPA to Trademark Disputes Regarding
Domain Names
To bring an in rem action against a domain name under the

ACPA, the plaintiff must satisfy the test under either the traditional
unfair competition statute or trademark dilution statute. 149 The
corresponding trademark unfair competition statute requires the
trademark owner to demonstrate that the registrant's use of the
domain name is likely to confuse consumers as to the source. 50 For
example, the plaintiff must establish that the consumers or potential
consumers of its goods and services at the registrant's web site are
likely to believe that the web site is associated with or authorized by

the plaintiff.' The trademark dilution statute requires the trademark
owner to demonstrate that its trademark is famous and/or distinctive
and the registrant's use of the domain name is diluting the
distinctiveness of the plaintiff's trademark.'52 The requirement of
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), including that the defendant's use of the domain
name causes a likelihood of confusion).
148. See § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (establishing that the plaintiff may bring an in rem action if
"the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark ... protected under
subsection ... (c)"); see also Cable News Network, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 515 (ruling that the
plaintiff may also prevail on a motion for summary judgment in an ACPA in rem action if
the plaintiff establishes each of the elements of trademark dilution under § 1125(c)).
149. By comparison, a plaintiff under the ACPA in personam action is required to
show that the defendant (1) had a bad faith intent to profit from the plaintiff's protected
mark and (2) registered or uses a domain name that is dilutive of, or identical or
confusingly similar to, the plaintiff's trademark. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v.
Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the mark in question is
distinctive, that the domain name in question is confusingly similar to the mark, and that
there is evidence of bad faith); Aztar Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1464 (citing the
requirements of the ACPA).
150. See § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (referencing the federal unfair competition and dilution
statutes).
151. Plaintiff must prove the following elements for trademark infringement or unfair
competition claims:
(1) that it possesses a mark;
(2) that the registrant used the mark;
(3) that the registrant's use of the mark occurred "in commerce;"
(4) that the registrant used the mark "in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising" of goods or services; and
(5) that the registrant used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers.
Cable News Network, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001)).
152. See id. at 520-22 (ruling that the plaintiff "failed to establish a basis for summary
judgment on its claim for dilution under Section 1125(c), and therefore, under Section
1125(d)(2)(A)"). Generally, to prove dilution the plaintiff must show that (1) it owns
valid and enforceable rights in the trademark; (2) the trademark is famous and was famous
before the registration or use of the domain name; (3) the registration of the domain name
or use of the domain name constitutes use of the trademark in commerce; and (4) the
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proof under the federal unfair competition or trademark dilution
statutes as part of the ACPA in rem claim imposes a higher burden of
proof on the plaintiff than in an in personam action.153
Although several circuits interpret the trademark dilution statute
as requiring a trademark owner to establish that her mark is both
famous and distinctive,154 the ACPA permits a trademark owner to
bring an ACPA in personam action if her mark is either famous or
distinctive.'55 In the case of a distinctive mark, the plaintiff must
prove that, at the time of registration, the domain name is either
identical or confusingly similar to the distinctive mark.156 "Identical
or confusingly similar" is a much lower burden of proof than the
likelihood of confusion test under the trademark unfair competition
or infringement statute.157 In the case of a famous trademark,
however, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the domain name is
identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of the famous mark at
the time the domain name was registered. 5 ' Again, proof that the
domain name is "identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of the
famous trademark" requires a lower threshold of proof compared to
the federal trademark dilution statute where the burden of proof is
either by the likelihood of dilution or actual dilution test.'59
registration and/or use of the domain name dilutes the distinctive quality of the trademark.
Id. at 520.
153. See id. at 515 (ruling that a plaintiff under in rem ACPA claim must establish each
element of the trademark infringement or trademark dilution. and defendant's bad faith
registration or use of the domain name); cf Morrison & Foerster. v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d
1125, 1130 (D. Colo. 2000) (applying, in an in personam action, a direct comparison
between the plaintiff's trademarks and defendant's domain names, not the likelihood of
confusion test under the Lanham Act).
A recent decision by the Fourth Circuit, however, held that the in rem ACPA
provision is not limited to claims of bad faith domain name registrations, but also covers in
rem actions for federal trademark infringement and dilution claims. In the latter claims,
the bad faith element is not required. Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302
F.3d 214, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that in rem provision covers bad faith
registration claims, infringement claims, and dilution claims).
154. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1999)
(ruling that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a trademark is both famous and distinctive
for a claim under the federal trademark dilution statute).
155. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 497 n.10 (2d Cir.
2000) (declining to consider whether the plaintiff's trademark is famous, as it would have
to determine under the federal trademark dilution law, "since the ACPA provides
protection not only to famous marks but also to distinctive marks regardless of fame").
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2000).
157. See Morrison & Foerster,94 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
159. See id.; N. Light Tech. Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 11.7 n.26 (D. Mass.
2000) (suggesting that dizneepresentssexkittens.com is inherently dilutive of DISNEY,
even though not identical or confusingly similar); Nguyen, supra note 129 at 799-801
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Further, the plaintiff in an ACPA in rem action must establish
that the domain name registrant registered or uses the domain name
with a bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the plaintiff's
trademark. 6 ° The statute provides nine factors to determine bad
faith.16 '
The legislative history on the in rem provision under the ACPA
is sparse yet relatively complicated.' 62 The Senate Report noted the
difficulty that trademark owners face in pursuing infringement claims
(analyzing and comparing the burden of proof for dilution under the ACPA and the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act).
160. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 669-79
(E.D. Va. 2001) (analyzing the element of bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of
the plaintiff's trademark), affd in part, rev'd in part, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002). On
appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit in Harrods held that the bad faith requirement should
not be treated as an additional element for in rem claim. A plaintiff in an in rem action
can assert trademark infringement, trademark dilution, or bad faith registration against
domain names. Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 223-24 (4th
Cir. 2002).
161. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(I), the nine factors are:
(1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the
domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person
or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the
bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill
represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish
or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to
the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or
having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods
or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact information
when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's intentional
failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which
the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are
distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names,
without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection
(c)(1) of [section 43].
See also Harrods,157 F. Supp. 2d at 669-79 (analyzing each of the nine factors).
162. See FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 12629 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting the complicated legislative history of the ACPA).
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against cybersquatters, as many cybersquatters register domain names
using an alias or provide otherwise false information to the registrar
to avoid identification and service of process by the trademark
1
owners.163 The in rem provision serves to eliminate this difficulty. 6
To protect "the notions of fair play and substantial justice," a
trademark owner can assert an in rem action only in cases where the
trademark owner, after due diligence, is unable to find the domain
name registrant. 65 Under the analysis section of Senate Bill 1255, the

Senate Report repeats the difficulty faced by trademark owners and
notes how the in rem provision alleviates that difficulty while
protecting the notions of fair play and substantial justice. 66 Both the

163. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10 (1999). The Senate Report, under the Subheading
'In rem Jurisdiction,' also states that the 'in rem provision balances the meaningful
protection to trademark owner and the interest of privacy and anonymity on the Internet.
Dissidents want to preserve their online incognito by giving false information to domain
name registrars for anonymity and privacy purposes. To preserve dissidents' interests, the
in rem provision allows trademark owners to sue the domain names themselves. This
"decreases the need for trademark owners to join the hunt to chase down and root out
these dissidents or others seeking anonymity on the Net." Id. at 11.
164. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-464, at 113-14 (1999) (explaining that the in rem
provision is designed to alleviate the difficulty faced by trademark owners when
cybersquatters "register domain names under aliases or otherwise provide false
information in their registration applications in order to avoid identification and service of
process by the mark owner"); see also Alitalia-Lineee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v.
Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 n.16 (E.D. Va. 2001) (citing the Congressional
conference report's goal of facilitating a cause of action against cybersquatters who
intentionally avoid identification).
165. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10 (1999):
The bill, as amended, will alleviate this difficulty, while protecting the notions of
fair play and substantial justice, by enabling a mark owner to seek an injunction
against the infringing property in those cases where, after due diligence, a mark
owner is unable to proceed against the domain name registrant because the
registrant has provided false contact information and is otherwise not to be
found.
166. The Senate Report also states:
This bill will alleviate this difficulty, while protecting the notions of fair play and
substantial justice, by enabling a mark owner to seek an injunction against the
infringing property in those cases where, after due diligence, a mark owner is
unable to proceed against the domain name registrant because the registrant has
provided false contact information and is otherwise not to be found, provided the
markowner can show that the domain name itself violates substantive Federal
trademark law (i.e., that the domain name'violates the rights of the registrant of a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or section 43(a) or (c) of
the Trademark Act) .... [T]he relief available in such an in rem action is limited
to an injunction ordering the forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer of the domain
name.
Id. at 16.
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Senate Bill and the accompanying report were silent as to where a
trademark owner may file an in rem action against a domain name.167
The House had its own version, H.R. 3028, which was entitled
Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act.168 Unlike Senate Bill S.
1255, H.R. 3028 contained a provision on which judicial district a
trademark owner may file an in rem action against a domain name.'6 9
A trademark owner could bring such action "in the judicial district in
which suit may be brought against the domain name registrar, domain
name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or
170
assigned the domain name.'
The accompanying House Report explains that an in rem action
is appropriate where personal jurisdiction cannot be established over
the domain name registrant. 171 Such a situation occurs "when a nonU.S. resident cybersquatts on a domain name that infringes upon a
U.S. trademark.' 1 72 The House Report emphasizes that "[t]his type
of in rem jurisdiction still requires a nexus based upon a U.S. registry
1 73
or registrar and such that would not offend international comity.'
Consequently, in rem jurisdiction would not be extended to "any

167. See id. at 10-11, 16.
168. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 1-5 (1999) (reporting amendment of H.R. 3028).
169. See id. at 3.
170. The relevant paragraph of H.R. 3028 provides:
(2)(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain
name in the judicial district in which suit may be brought against the domain
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name if(i) the domain name violates any right of the registrant of a mark registered
in the Patent and Trademark Office, or subsection (a) or (c) of this section,
or is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of title
18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States Code;
and
(ii) the court finds that(I) the owner has demonstrated due diligence and was not able to find
or was not able to serve a person who would have been a defendant in a
civil action under paragraph (1); or
(11) personal jurisdiction cannot be established over any person who
would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1).
(B) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a
court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name to the owner of
the mark
(C) The in rem action established under this paragraph and any remedy available
under such action shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy
otherwise applicable.
Id.
171. Id. at 14.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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domain name registries existing outside the United States. Nor would
this jurisdiction preclude the movement of any registries to outside of
the United States.' 17 4 This report demonstrates that Congress
intended to provide in rem jurisdiction in all cases as long as the
registrar or registry is located in the United States.'75 Nexus is present
by mere digital connection between the domain name and its registrar
or between the domain name and its registry.'76
Further, as illustrated in the House Report, Congress believed
that providing in rem jurisdiction when in personam jurisdiction over
the cybersquatter is unavailable would provide protection for both
trademark owners and consumers of electronic commerce.'77 Finally,
in rem jurisdiction does not offend due process, as reasoned in the
House Report, because the domain name is "only the property ...
subject of the jurisdiction, not other substantive personal rights of any
individual defendant."' 78
In summary, Congress enacted the ACPA to curb illegal
activities in the borderless and electronic sector for the purpose of
nurturing the growth of electronic communications, transactions and
commerce. The in rem provision under the ACPA, however, creates
a new trademark right based solely on the digital connection between
the domain name and the U.S. registry or registrar.
IV. THE MANIFESTATION OF THE DIGITAL TRADEMARK RIGHT
THROUGH IN REM CYBERJURISDICrTION

Neither Digitalnor Physical Contact Needed
Before the growth of Internet commerce, federal trademark law
did not authorize an in rem action against a trademark itself.'79 In
rem actions were not authorized, in part, because in rem relief is often
A.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. ("[P]roviding in rem jurisdiction based upon the lack of personal jurisdiction
over the cybersquatter would provide protection both for trademark owners and perhaps,
more importantly, consumers.").
178. See id.
179. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. AllPorsche.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707,712-13 (E.D.
Va. 1999) (denying in rem relief under federal trademark statutes). The ACPA later
superseded this case, followed by the Fourth Circuit vacating and remanding the decision.
Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. AllPorsche.com, 251 F.3d 1320 (Table), 2000 WL 742185 (4th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see also Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdictionin Cyberspace, 75
WASH. L. REV. 97, 107-10 (2000) (discussing the history of the Porsche Cars case as the
first case asserting in rem action against domain names).
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viewed as extraordinary. 8 0 In rem actions adjudicate the rights of the
parties in the res in absentia and, therefore, such actions raise serious
due process concerns. 8 ' At least one court was cautious about in rem
relief in trademark cases prior to the enactment of the ACPA,
declining to extend the federal trademark dilution claim against
domain names themselves.'82 The court expressed concern about a
potential due process violation in the absence of in personam
jurisdiction against the domain name registrant.'83
The urgent desire to curb cybersquatting activities on the
Internet led to the development of a statutory framework in
trademark cases where the substantive rights in the domain name are
determined without the presence of the original owner. 84 In such
cases, U.S. courts are the sole tribunal to adjudicate the rights of
180. See Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340,
345 n.11 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that the limitation of remedies available for in rem action
is consistent with the extraordinary nature of in rem relief and citing In re Graham, 1998
WL 473051, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1998) (recognizing the extraordinary nature of
in rem relief)); McQueeny v. J.W. Fergusson & Sons, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D.N.J.
1981) (observing that "in rem or quasi in rem is an extraordinary writ"); see also Brewster
et al., supra note 135, at 89 (stating that in rem action is useful, but contains an "important
limitation: it only can be used to transfer the domain name and cannot be used as the sole
jurisdictional basis to pursue a cause of action that might result in personal liability").
181. See Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 345 n.ll (stating that the
Supreme Court had held that "the exercise of in rem jurisdiction must comply with the due
process requirements" and citing Shaffer v. Heitner,433 U.S. 186, 206-09 (1977)).
182. See Porsche Cars N. Am., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (expressing concern over the
constitutional implications of in rem actions that the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over
domain names without in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the domain names
might violate the Due Process Clause), vacated and remanded by 215 F.3d 1320 (Table),
2000 WL 742185 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding the ACPA allows in rem action
against domain names and applies retroactively to plaintiff's action against defendant's
domain names).
183. See id. at 713.
Although in rem proceedings purport to affect nothing more than the disposition
of property, they necessarily affect the interests of persons as well. As a result,
courts generally cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of
property unless the Due Process Clause would have permitted in personam
jurisdiction over those who have an interest in the res.
Id. at 712.
184. See Brewster et al., supra note 135, at 89-90 (stating that in rem is the last resort
when in personam jurisdiction is not available and due diligence efforts to find the
cybersquatter have been expended). See generally S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4, 10-11 (1999)
(describing the purpose of the proposed bill S. 1255 and discussing the purpose of the in
rem provision and how it provides a means for trademark holder to combat
cybersquatters); H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5, 14 (1999) (describing the purpose of
proposed bill H.R. 3028 and identifying unique problems faced by trademark owners in
cyberspace due to the lack of in personam jurisdiction over registrants and explaining how
the in rem provision will alleviate the problems); H.R. REP. No. 106-464 (Conf. Rep.), at
113-14 (1999) (explaining when in rem relief is available to trademark holders).
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foreign registrants in their domain names, though the foreign
registrants have no contact, digital or physical, with any of the fifty
states.'85 As the direct beneficiaries, the U.S. trademark owners gain
a new protection for their trademarks in the digital area. The U.S.
trademark owners need not travel to foreign nations to litigate their
alleged rights in the trademarks being violated by the foreign
registrants on foreign soil because they are entitled to litigate all in
rem actions in the United States.'86 Hence, U.S. trademark owners
can obtain the domain name, and thereby enjoin the foreign
registrant from further ownership of the domain name in ".com," the
most coveted Top-Level Domain ("TLD"), anywhere in the world.187
Under the ACPA, the court where the registrar is located has
jurisdiction over in rem actions.188 The question arises as to whether
any contact between the foreign registrant, the domain name, and the
forum is required to support the court's jurisdiction. A quick review

185. See, e.g., Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 862, 862
(E.D. Va. 2000) (noting that the registrant is a Canadian resident lacking minimum
contacts); Broadbridge Media v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that the registrant is located in British Columbia, Canada and has no minimum
contacts).
186. See Sharrock, supra note 143, at 824-25 (noting that the in rem provision confers
jurisdiction over the domain name itself and thus jurisdiction "applies regardless of
whether the participants are residents of other countries or even whether they have
minimum contacts with the forum").
187. In addition to the .com TLD, in rem domain name disputes in the .gov and .net
TLDs also will be brought in the United States. See Sharrock, supra note 143, at 825
(drawing implication from an in rem suit that cybersquatting claims in .com, .gov and .net
can be brought in the United States).
188. The in rem provision provides:
The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the
judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or
other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is
located ifthe domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the
Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c) of this
section; and
(ii) the court finds that the owner(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have
been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or (II) through due
diligence was not able to find a person who would have been a defendant in a
civil action under paragraph (1) by(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed under this
paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address
provided by the registrant to the registrar; and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after filing
the action.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
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of traditional in rem jurisdiction is in order prior to an attempt to
address the question.
1. In Rem Actions Before Cyberspace
There are three types of in rem actions: true in rem, quasi in rem
I and quasi in rem 11.189 In rem or true in rem actions arise when
courts adjudicate the property rights corresponding to a particular res
for every potential rights holder, regardless of whether each rights
holder is named in the proceeding.19 Examples of true in rem actions
include forfeiture, condemnation, probate, and arrests of vessels in
admiralty. 91
In quasi in rem I actions, courts adjudicate property rights as
against particular named persons. 192 Actions to remove a cloud on a
title to land or actions to quiet title against another individual's claim
are examples of quasi in rem I actions. 193
The last type of in rem action is quasi in rem II, which is also
known as an "attachment" or "sequestration" proceeding. 194 Quasi in

rem II generally concerns the rights of a particular person or persons
in a thing and yet the underlying claim in the quasi in rem II action is
unrelated to the res that provides jurisdiction.' 95 In such an action,
"the plaintiff does not dispute the property rights of the owner of the
res, but seeks to obtain the res in satisfaction of some separate
189. See generally FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d
121,132 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting three distinctive types of in rem actions (citing Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958)); Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F.
Supp. 2d 484, 490 (E.D. Va. 2001) (listing the three types of in rem actions);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: Topic
Note, at 7-9 (1971); WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS &

2. immovables, Introductory

WILLIAM M. RICHMAN,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30, at 74-75 (1984) (discussing the three types of
in rem actions).
190. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,246 n.12 (1958); FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d
at 132; see also REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 189, at 74 (describing the true in rem
action).
191. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246 n.12 (noting that in rem judgments affect interests in
property); FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 132; see also REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra
note 189, at 74 (listing examples of true in rem actions in admiralty, probate, forfeiture,
and condemnation).
192. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 132; see also REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra
note 189, at 75 (stating that, in a quasi in rem I action, the plaintiff claims an interest as
against certain named individuals only).
193. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
194. Id. (noting the third type of in rem proceeding is also a subcategory of the second
type of in rem proceeding, hence, is called "quasi in rem type II" proceeding and may be
called an "attachment" or "sequestration" proceeding); see also Cable News Network, 162
F. Supp. 2d at 490 & n.17 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246 n.12).
195. Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
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claim."196
An example of a quasi in rem II action is the controversial

decision Shaffer v. Heitner.197 In that case, the Supreme Court held
the Delaware jurisdiction statute unconstitutional. The statute
provided quasi in rem jurisdiction through the sequestration of a
Delaware corporation's stock for the purpose of compelling the
personal appearance of the nonresident defendants in a matter
unrelated to the property upon which the quasi in rem jurisdiction
was based.198 Specifically, the underlying claim, the shareholders'
derivative action against a corporation's corporate managers, was
unrelated to the res-the stock certificates held by the nonresident
corporate managers; this relationship allegedly served as the basis for
jurisdiction under the Delaware statute.199 The Shaffer Court ruled
that the action must satisfy the minimum-contacts requirement such
that the maintenance of the action does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice under International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.20 o
Some courts interpreted Shaffer to require that all in rem cases
conform to the same due process constraints as in personam cases.2 °1
Such interpretation finds support in the Shaffer opinion where it
states that "the standard for determining whether an exercise of
jurisdiction over the interest of persons is consistent with the Due
Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in
InternationalShoe."2 ' Other courts hold that the language of Shaffer
requires minimum contacts only for quasi in rem II cases.20 3
196. FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
197. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977). Courts believe that Shaffer is
a controversial decision, casting doubt on the constitutionality of certain in rem
proceedings. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 489-90; FleetBoston, 138 F.
Supp. 2d at 132-35.
198. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 193.
199. Id. at 190-92.
200. See id. at 207 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
201. As one court noted:
Shaffer appears to demand that the Fourteenth Amendment be read to prohibit
all in rem jurisdiction except when the person whose property rights are being
extinguished has had 'minimum contacts' with the forum state 'such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' Nothing that the Supreme Court has done subsequently casts
doubt on that holding. Dicta in Shaffer suggests that the Supreme Court
intended its holding to extend the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe to
all in rem jurisdiction, not solely to the subcategory of attachment jurisdiction.
FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (citations omitted).
202. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491-92 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
207 and citing FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 133-34).
203. See Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 793-94 (10th Cir. 1979);
Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d
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2. In Rem Actions in Cyberspace
Courts and legislatures must consider carefully whether in rem
jurisdiction over domain names is proper in the realm of borderless,
electronic commerce. If a domain name is the res underlying the
dispute, a quick and easy answer is that the action against the domain
name falls within the genre of true in rem.2" The problem, however,

arises as to the situs of the res. Domestic law, such as the ACPA,
designates the judicial district where the registrar is located as the
situs for the res and authorizes in rem jurisdiction in that judicial
district.2
The provision assumes that the registrant had an
expectation to have its right in the domain name adjudicated in that
judicial district. 2°6 After all, the registrant did, arguably, have some
digital contact with that venue, albeit not enough to create minimum
contacts with the forum.20 7 Essentially, some minimum interests exist
648, 654-55 (2d Cir. 1979); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d
502, 503-04 (E.D. Va. 2000); Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.19 (citing
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619-28 (1990)); John N. John, Jr., Inc. v.
Brahma Petroleum Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (W.D. La. 1988)). The court also cited
two law review articles for support. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491 n.19
(citing Thomas R. Lee, In rem Jurisdictionin Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97 (2000)
(discussing Shaffer v. Heitner and explaining how in rem jurisdiction over domain names is
constitutional); and Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 967-68 (2000) (advocating a "minimum
interest" approach and explaining how the approach is consistent with Shaffer)).
204. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491 ("[I1t remains generally accepted
that when 'property is found within the forum state and other prerequisites to in rem
jurisdiction are satisfied, courts have routinely (if not unanimously) exercised jurisdiction
over competing claims to the property without any hint of a due process problem."
(quoting Lee, supra note 203, at 142)).
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) & (C) (2000); FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 135
(ruling the situs for in rem action is in the Eastern District of Virginia where the registrar
is located); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, No. 00 Civ. 8705 DLC, 2001 WL 436207, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 1,2001) (ruling the court lacked in rem jurisdiction over captainbarbie.com
because the domain name registrar is not located within the judicial district).
206. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (noting that "[i]n registering the website,
the registrant may be expected to have notice that he would be subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts in the Eastern District of Virginia" and contrasting that to the present case
where the alleged cybersquatter had made no contact with the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to justify the in rem action in the District Court of Massachusetts); Caesars
World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 504 ("[T]o the extent that minimum contacts are required for in
rem jurisdiction under Shaffer ... , the fact of domain name registration with Network
Solutions, Inc., in Virginia supplies that.").
207. Compare Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 859 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(ruling registration of domain names with the registrar located in Virginia, without more,
failed to establish minimum contacts with the forum for in personam jurisdiction), with
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349-50
(E.D. Va. 2001) (finding in personam jurisdiction over the foreign registrant was proper in
a case where the registrant's web site provided interactive, online gambling as this activity
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for the registrant not to be surprised at having its right in the domain
name litigated in the judicial district where the registrar is located.2 °8
Such minimum interests seem to comport with the traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.20 9
The development of the minimum interest standard for in rem
action in trademark disputes, however, takes a different turn in a
recent case. In Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 210 the
District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia adjudicated the
Chinese national registrant's right in a domain name in rem, despite
the defendant's lack of minimum contacts with, or minimum interest
in, the forum.211 The Chinese registrant had no contact-other than
NSI's storage of cnnnews.com's domain name-with the registrar
located in the judicial district of the in rem action. 212 At the time of
the litigation, the Chinese registrant used the service of a registrar
that is located in China, outside the judicial district of the U.S.
registrar, for the purpose of in rem action.213
The plaintiff, Cable News Network (CNN), was a Delaware
company with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. 214 It
was in the business of providing news and information services
throughout the world through various electronic media.2 5 It owns the
trademark "CNN" and has registered the trademark in many
countries, including China.2 16 Plaintiff's news services were accessible
21 7
via the Internet at "cnn.com.'
Maya, a company located in China, registered "cnnews.com"
with NSI (subsequently known as a VeriSign company), which is
located in Herndon, Virginia.21 s Prior to the litigation, Maya changed
the registrar for the cnnews.com domain name from NSI to Eastern
Communications Company ("Eastcom"), a registrar located in
was purposefully directed at Virginia consumers and the record disclosed that Virginia
residents have visited, joined, and played games at the website).
208. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 134-35 (ruling that 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice' would be compromised if a court obtained in rem jurisdiction
over the domain name in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction where the registrant
registered the domain name).
209. See id. (quoting Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 504).
210. Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d. 484 (E.D. Va. 2001).
211. See id. at 486-87.
212. Id. at 487.
213. Id. at 488.
214. Id. at 486.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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China.219 Maya operated the cnnews.com website, providing news
and information to Chinese-speaking individuals.2 2 This website is
part of Maya's comprehensive e-business services.221 The cnnews.com
website is one of many sites, such as cnsport.com and cnnav.com,
linked to Maya's main website, cnmaya.com.2 2 The "cn" prefix refers
to "China" and is widely understood and used as an abbreviation for
'
the country name "China."223
Further, the top level internet domain
224
for China is "cn."
In addition, other Chinese companies in the news
and information industry, unrelated to Maya, also own active web
sites and use domain names with the "cn" prefix, such as cnnctv.com
(China National Communication and Television Net), cnnac.com
(China Network and Communication), and cnnettv.net (China
225
Network TV Net).
CNN brought an in rem action against the cnnews.com domain
name. As the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the
registrant Maya, the court asserted in rem jurisdiction over the
domain name, as the alternative means of establishing jurisdiction
provided by the ACPA.226 Maya asserted that the in rem action was
an unconstitutional violation of due process because Maya had no
contact with any U.S. state and its domain name is used in connection
with a web site that is in the Chinese language and directed to persons
in China.227 Maya's targeted audience is located entirely within China
and most of its audience has never heard of plaintiff CNN.22 8 Maya's
statistics reflected that 99.5% of the registered users of Maya's
websites are located within Chinese cities. 2 29 Further, all of Maya's
business is conducted in the Chinese language and it does not transact
any business in the United States. 230 Accordingly, Maya claimed that
its choice of the domain name cnnews.com was reasonable. Further,
Maya argued that there was no contractual relationship between
VeriSign and the registrant.3

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 488.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 487 n.6.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 487 n.7.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 487, 489.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
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The court analyzed whether a judicial disposition of Maya's
substantive rights to a domain name in an ACPA in rem action
comports with due process in light of Shaffer.232 The court interpreted
Shaffer's rationale as confined to quasi in rem II, or attachment
proceedings,233 finding that true in rem and quasi in rem I actions are
outside the reach of Shaffer.234 The court also espoused that
"Shaffer's language regarding true in rem and quasi in rem I matters
[was] unnecessary to the holding and is therefore non-binding
dicta. '235 Further, because neither a true in rem case nor a quasi in
rem I action was before the Supreme Court in Shaffer, the case's
holding is limited to the quasi in rem II action at issue.236 In addition,
the court noted that other courts in non-trademark cases have
routinely and unanimously exercised in rem jurisdiction without
expressing due process concerns.2

7

Moreover, the court asserted that

viewing Shaffer as requiring the same minimum contacts in all in rem
cases as for in personam cases would run counter to historical practice
and common sense.238 With such reasoning, the court classified the in

rem action under the ACPA within the true in rem action genre
because it involves the rights of a disputed domain name/trademark
for every potential rights holder.239

Accordingly, there is no

requirement under Shaffer to establish that the foreign registrant has
minimum contacts with the forum. 24 ° The court concluded that
241
"Shaffer is no bar to an ACPA in rem action.

Cable News Network represents the first and foremost expansion
of in rem actions involving trademark and domain name.242 The court
232. Id. at 489.
233. Id. at 490 ("Shaffer clearly holds that quasi in rem II and in personam proceedings
require the same minimum contacts so as to satisfy due process ... .
234. Id.
235. Id. at 491 (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)).
236. Id. ("Because neither a true in rem case, nor a quasi in rem I case was before the
Supreme Court in Shaffer, the case's holding does not reach those categories.").
237. Id. at 491 n.19 (citing cases to demonstrate that the majority view is that Shaffer
requires minimum contacts only in quasi in rem type II cases).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 490.
242. Courts have declined to assert in rem jurisdiction in cases where the registrants
had no contact with the judicial district. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com,
Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 656, 657-58 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (declining in rem jurisdiction in a case
where the registrant has no contact with the judicial district); FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v.
Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 134 (D. Mass. 2001) (same); Mattel, Inc. v.
Barbie-club.com, 58 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1798, 1799-800 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same). Courts extended
in rem jurisdiction in cases where the registrants had made digital contact with the judicial
district. See, e.g., Hartog & Co. AS v. Swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534-36 (E.D. Va.
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ruled that the in rem action was proper even though the current

registrar-Eastcom-was not located in the judicial district in
Virginia; rather, Eastcom was located in China.243 Furthermore, the
domain name registrant, located in China, had no contractual
relationship with VeriSign, the registrar located in the state of
Virginia.244 In essence, the decision allowed an in rem action where
the domain name registrant had no reasonable expectation to defend
its substantive right in the domain name in a judicial district where its
registrar was not even located. 245 The domain name registrant did not
even have digital contact with the forum,246 much less a minimum
interest in the forum. 247 The decision, therefore, offends traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.248
Essentially, the Cable News Network decision holds that no

contact is required between the foreign registrant and the forum in an
in rem action under the ACPA. This holding would be utterly unfair
to those domain name registrants of .com, .net, and .org top-level
domain names who do not have contact with Virginia. These
registrants, unexpectedly, may be forced to have their property rights
adjudicated in the Eastern District of Virginia, independent of their
2 49
contact with the Virginia forum.
2001) (exercising in rem jurisdiction in a case where the registrant had registered domain
names with NSI); Caesars World, Inc. v. ceasars-palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504
(E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that there is no need for minimum contacts when the property,
the domain name, is located in the forum state and related to the cause of action).
243. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 488.
244. Compare id. at 492 (finding no contacts through mere contractual relations), with
FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (noting that in rem jurisdiction in Caesars World was
proper because "the alleged cybersquatter had at least made contact with the judicial
district seeking to exert jurisdiction by contacting a business in that district and purchasing
a service (the registration of its domain name) from that business").
245. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (noting that Eastcom is located in
China).
246. At the time of the litigation, all registration services were conducted through the
Chinese registrar, Eastcom. Id. at 488.
247. See Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (noting that the registration service
contact with a registrar located in Virginia satisfies the minimum contact requirement for
an in rem action).
248. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 134-35 (ruling that if "minimum contacts are
not required at all with the owner of the res but only with the res itself, traditional notions
of fair play and justice would be compromised").
249. Id. at 135 ("Serious constitutional questions would be raised by ... allow[ing] an
in rem action [to] be brought ... in a jurisdiction in which the owner of the domain name
may have had absolutely no contact whatsoever."). A counter argument could be
formulated that Cable News Network is a sound decision, meeting the Congressional
intent to close down all loopholes relating to cybersquatting. Otherwise, potential
defendants could avoid liability by registering domain names with registrants outside the
United States and therefore the domain names at issue will not be subject to in rem

2003]

DIGITAL TRADEMARK

529

The basis for the overreaching in rem action under Cable News
Network rests on the ACPA's treatment of the official registry as the
basis for in rem actions involving domain names registered in the
.com, .net, and .org top level domains.25 ° NSI (a VeriSign company),
located in Virginia, is the only official registry for domain names in
the .com, .net, and .org top level domains.25 1
In other words, under the holding and rationale of Cable News
Network, a domain name registrant residing in Australia, who
registered a domain name in the .com top-level domain with a
registrar located in Canada, faces the possibility of an in rem action in
the state of Virginia. The domain name registrant probably never
expected that its substantive right in the domain name would be
adjudicated in the state of Virginia. The registrant has digital contact
only with the registrar in Canada, and lacks even digital contact with
the Virginia forum.
B.

The Official Registry for In Rem ExtraterritorialReach

An in rem action is predicated on the notion that the res is found
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.252 Where is a domain
name res located? The quest to determine where a domain name is
located for in rem purposes faces several peculiar problems. A
domain is located everywhere a computer is connected to the Internet
and is also located nowhere because it has no physical form. 3 To

Actions under the ACPA in the United States. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7-8 (1999); H.
REP. No. 106-412, at 5-6 (1999).
250. See CableNews Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
251. See infra notes 255, 259-71 and accompanying text.
252. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
253. The everywhere and nowhere characteristics of the Internet have been noted by
many commentators. See generally Brian L. Berlandi, What State Am I In? Common Law
Trademarks on the Internet, 4 MICH. TELECOMM., & TECH. L. REV. 105, 123-24 (1998)

(noting the everywhere and nowhere nature of the Internet); Roberta S. Karmel,
Regulatory Initiatives and the Internet: A New Era of Oversight for the Securities and

Exchange Commission, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 33 (2002) ("The global
nature of Internet communications can lead to the conclusion thatInternet activities occur
everywhere, nowhere, or both simultaneously, creating jurisdictional conflicts in laws and
courts."); Ira S. Nathenson, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral. Property Rights and
PersonalJurisdictionover Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites,58 U. PIrr. L. REV.

911, 935-46 (1997) (stating that the difficulty of asserting jurisdiction over a defendant in
cyberspace who uses a domain name is the cyber-defendant is said to be "everywhere and
nowhere at the same time"); Norbert Reich & Axel Halfmeier, Consumer Protectionin the
Global Village: Recent Developments in German and European Union Law, 106 DICK. L.

REV. 111, 118 (2001) (noting that suppliers in cyberspace seem to be "everywhere and
nowhere, a little bit like Alice in Wonderland").
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simplify the situs254 determination for domain names, the ACPA
names the location of the registrar or the registry as the situs.255 The
ACPA further designates that the court where the registry is located
has in rem jurisdiction over the domain names stored in the
registry.256 But who is the registrar and what and where is the
registry?
A registrar is the entity that administers the registration of
domain names. 257 The registry is the official entity that maintains all
official records regarding all domain name registrations in the toplevel domains. 258 The domain name and associated information, such
as registrant name, address, e-mail address, fax number, telephone
number, and date of registration are maintained in the centralized
WHOIS database. 259 NSI (a VeriSign company) has the exclusive and
sole control of the WHOIS database of all domain names in the .com,
.org, and .net top-level domains.260
254. Situs is defined as the place where a thing is considered, with reference to
jurisdiction over it. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (5th ed. 1983).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000) ("The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil
action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the
domain name is located.").
256. Id.
257. For a current list of domain name registrars, see ICANN, ACCREDITED
REGISTRARS, at http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last modified Aug.
12, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The list indicates that Verisign
Global Registry Services (essentially, NSI) operates the registry files for .com, .net, and
.org TLDs. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 123 n.2 ("[A] registrar is one of several
entities, for a given TLD, that is authorized by ICANN [Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers] to grant registration of domain names to registrants.").
258. See FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 123 n.2 ("[A] registry is the single official
entity that maintains all official records regarding registrations in the TLD [top level
domain] .... ). For detailed definitions of Registry Data, Registry Database and Registry
Services, see ICANN, .COM REGISTRY AGREEMENT, at http://www.icann.org/tlds/
agreements/verisign/registry-agmt-com-25may0l.htm (last modified June 10, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
259. See Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1161 n.2 (N.D. Ala.
2001) (describing NSI's registry unit that stores the centralized WHOIS database);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining the
content of the WHOIS database collected by various registrars).
Pursuant to the Registry Agreement between ICANN and VeriSign, the "Registry
Database" contains all data about domain names that is used to generate domain name
resource records or responses to domain name availability lookup requests or WHOIS
queries. See ICANN, .COM REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 258; see also Jay P. Kesan
& Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You-Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We
Can Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain
Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 183 (2001) (discussing NSI's claim of ownership of
WHOIS database and present control of the .com, .net, and org TLDs).
260. See Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 & n.2 (explaining NSI functions both as a
registrar and the official Registry); Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 181-83 (explaining
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Beginning in 1993, NSI was the sole registrar of domain names
for the .com, .org, .net, and .edu top-level domains by virtue of a
contract NSI secured with the National Science Foundation. 61 In
1998, the Department of Commerce began the process of transition to
a competitive system of domain name registration.2 62 The Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), a
private, non-profit corporation was created to assume the U.S.
government's responsibilities for the management of the Internet
domain name system and to increase competition and international
participation in the domain name registration system. 263 As part of
the history of NSI's monopoly in the WHOIS database); see also ICANN, ACCREDITED
REGISTRARS, supra note 257, at http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last
modified Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (listing VeriSign
Global Registry Services operates .com, .net., and .org).
261. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 181-83 (discussing the rise of NSI's
monopoly beginning in 1993); see also PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F.
Supp. 2d 389, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (explaining that NSI won the bid solicited by the
National Science Foundation for registration of domain names in the .com, .net, .org,
.edu., and .gov Top Level Domains), affd, 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000); Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Under a
contract with the National Science Foundation, NSI manages domain name registrations
for the '.com,' '.net,' '.org,' '.edu,' and '.gov' top-level domains."), affd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th
Cir. 1999). For an Internet timeline, see BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE INTERNET, at http://www.isoc.org/internet-history/brief.html (last modified Aug. 4,
2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Management of Internet
Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,742 (June 10, 1998) (describing the evolution of a
private domain name system designed to increase competition and international
participation).
NSI is no longer the exclusive registrar; there are more than fifty domain name
registrars in the .com, .net, and .org top-level domains. One court, for example, noted that
NSI
formerly enjoyed a monopoly as the only domain name registrar. NSI still
operates and maintains the top-level domain name servers and zone files which
enable the other registrars to access the DNS and to transmit domain name
registration information for the .com, .net, and .org top level domain names to
the [Internet Domain Name] System.
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Therefore,
though NSI is not the sole registrar, it continues to monopolize the registry of the .com,
.net, and .org.
262. See Marcelo Halpern & Ajay K. Mehrotra, From International Treaties to Internet
Norms: The Evolution of InternationalTrademark Disputes in the Internet Age, 21 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 523, 547-48 (2000) (stating that prior to the formation of ICANN, the
domain name registration process was administered solely by NSI until 1998); see also
Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 & n.4 (noting that NSI was the registrar for all domain
names registered within the .com, .org, net, and .edu TLDs from April 1993 until June
1999).
263. See Frankel, supra note 90, at 860-63 (discussing ICANN's unique role in the
operation of the Internet); Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 174-76 (discussing the
creation of ICANN for the purpose of managing and privatizing the domain name
system); see also Name.space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 577-78 (2d Cir.
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the transition, NSI's domain name registration service was divided
into two separate units-a registrar and a registry.264 As a registrar,
NSI continued to register domain names, not as a sole registrar, but as
one of eighty registrars accredited by ICANN.265 NSI, as a registrar,
maintains its own WHOIS database, which contains data drawn
from
2 66
NSI.
through
names
domain
registered
the customers who
Each registrar is required to compile a WHOIS database
containing information relating to its own registrations only. 267 NSI,
as the official registry unit for the Internet domain name registration
system, per its agreement with the Department of Commerce
maintains the centralized WHOIS database of all domain names in
the .com, .org, and .net top-level domains.2 6 All registrars, however,

2000) (discussing the privatization process of the Domain Name System by the United
States government in response to growing domestic and international concerns).
264. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 184 (stating that under the agreement
between ICANN and NSI in 1999, NSI agreed to divide its business into two parts, the
domain name registration business and the registry business); see also Smith, 135 F. Supp.
2d at 1161 (explaining NSI's function as registrar and registry).
265. See Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (noting that in June of 1999 there were six
accredited registrars and by 2001 the number increased to 80); see also ICANN,
ACCREDITED REGISTRARS, supra note 257 (providing a current list of all accredited
registrars). Though there is competition at the registrar level, the monopoly of the registry
for .com, .net, and org remains with NSI. See Pamela Segal, Attempts to Solve the
UDRP's Trademark Holder Bias: A Problem that Remains Unsolved Despite the
Introduction of New Top Level Domain Names, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1, *8-10 (Dec. 2001), at http://www.cojcr.org/articles-notes/vol3-l-an/segalframe.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting the lack of competition
at the registry level due to NSI's tight control of the registry).
266. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 183-84 (explaining the contents and use of
the WHOIS database and NSI's control of the database); see also Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at
1161 (noting the official Registry "maintains the centralized 'WHOIS' database of all
registered SLD names in the '.com,' '.org,' and '.net' TLDs, compiled from the
registrations in those TLDs submitted by all registrars, including NSI's registrar unit");
Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 241-42 (noting that each registrar must maintain its own
WHOIS database of the customers who register domain names through the registrar and
provide an online, interactive WHOIS database available for the public to search).
267. See Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 242 (explaining the WHOIS database
maintained by each registrar under a Registrar Accreditation Agreement with ICANN);
Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN's UDRP Under National Law, 3 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 4-5 (2002) (stating that NSI still operates and controls the server
and the file containing "a list of all" domain names, though other registrars can register
and add domain names to the file); ICANN, REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT,
at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may0l.htm (last modified May 18, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
268. See ICANN, ACCREDITED REGISTRARS, supra note 257 (listing that Verisign
Global Registry Services operates .com, .net, and .org); see also Hestermeyer, supra note
267, at 4 (stating that NSI continues to control the root server file containing all domain
names in the .com, net, and .org TLDs); Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 184 (stating
that NSI continues to control the Registry).
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are required to pay an annual fee of six dollars per domain name to
the official registry to place and maintain each domain name
registered in the registry's WHOIS database. 269 The accumulation of
the domain name registration data in the official registry's WHOIS

database permits all registrars to determine which domain names are
already registered and thus unavailable to others.2 70 Essentially, the
official registry "directly interacts with and serves registrars. '271 The

end-users, on the other hand, receive limited access to the official
registry's WHOIS database online for the purpose of determining
which registrar registered a domain name with the registry.2 72

On June 8, 2000, NSI became a wholly-owned subsidiary of
VeriSign, and the registry was renamed VeriSign Global Registry
Services.27 3 There are about thirty million domain name registrations
in the registry.274

About fourteen million of the domain name

registrations have been registered through NSI's registrar unit.275
Because NSI (the registry) is located in Herndon, Virginia, the

judicial district for in rem actions involving any domain name
registration in the .com, .org, and .net top-level domains will be in
269. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 184 (stating that other registrars pay NSI $6
per domain name for the maintenance of the registration system); see also Smith, 135 F.
Supp. 2d at 1161 (stating that all registrars are required to "pay a $6 per-year fee to the
Registry to place and maintain each domain name registered in the Registry's WHOIS
database); ICANN, REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION AGREEMENT, supra note 267
(outlining the terms of agreement between registrars and the registry).
270. See Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 183 (stating that the WHOIS database is
used to ascertain whether a domain name has already been registered); see also Smith, 135
F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (explaining the purpose and use of WHOIS database in domain name
registration); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 43 (2000) (explaining how a
domain name is resolved).
271. Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; see Hestermeyer, supra note 267, at 3-4 (explaining
that the only entity that can enter a requested domain name for registration in the master
root server holding a directory of all computers that hold TLD directories is the registrar).
272. Pursuant to Section II, Paragraph 11 of the Registry Agreements between ICANN
and VeriSign for .com, .net, and .org TLDs, VeriSign must provide free public querybased access to up-to-date data concerning domain name and nameserver registrations
maintained by the Registry. See ICANN, .COM REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 258;
ICANN, .NET REGISTRY AGREEMENT, at http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/verisign/
registry-agmt-net-25may01.htm (last modified May 28, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); ICANN, ORG REGISTRY AGREEMENT, at http://www.icann.org/
tldslagreements/verisign/registry-agmt-org-25may0l.htm (last modified May 28, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
273. See Kesan & Shah, supranote 259, at 181 (stating that VeriSign purchased NSI for
$21 billion); see also Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (noting that NSI became a whollyowned subsidiary of VeriSign).
274. See Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (noting the estimated number for domain name
registrations).
275. See id. (noting the defendant NSI's registration power).
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Virginia.276 This means that the courts in the Eastern District of
Virginia have in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the substantive rights
of all foreign registrants in domain names. 7 The district court there
becomes the global tribunal determining foreign registrants'
substantive rights even though the foreign registrants have no contact,
digital or otherwise, and no expectation that they will be haled into
the district court located in Virginia.278 Nothing in the domain name
registration document identifying Virginia as the forum for an in rem
action.279 Further, foreign registrants who register domain names with
registrars in their home country or a third country do not expect that
the state of Virginia, U.S.A. is the global forum for actions
adjudicating their rights in domain names.28° As a result of
designating the official registry as the situs and authorizing in rem
jurisdiction to the courts where the registry is located, the traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice are compromised.28 ' The
ACPA's in rem provisions would, therefore, force the foreign
national to litigate in a judicial district in America where the foreign
national had never been, had no intention to affect commerce, and
276. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492 (E.D. Va.
2001) ("[B]ecause VeriSign serves as the registry for all '.com' domain names [and] is
located within this district and has control over the cnnews.com domain name, in rem
jurisdiction in this case is therefore constitutional.").
277. See id.
278. Compare id. ("What matters in an in rem case is not the contractual relation that
may exist between a registrant and a registrar, but rather the nexus that exists between the
Registry, VeriSign, and the domain name, cnnews.com. It is this nexus that matters for
ACPA in rem actions."), with FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F.
Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D. Mass. 2001) (rejecting in rem jurisdiction where the owner of the
domain name has "absolutely no contact" with the forum and ruling in rem jurisdiction
based on arguments that "minimum contacts are only required with the United States and
not with the forum state or ... minimum contacts are not required at all with the owner of
the res but only with the res itself" unconstitutional).
279. See also Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 866
(E.D. Va. 2000) ("NSI's website does not indicate that it is located in Virginia or even that
NSI is a Virginia business .... As such, there is no evidence that [defendant] knew that
NSI was located in Virginia, let alone that he was purposefully directing his activities to
the Commonwealth.").
280. Even if the foreign registrants know that the registry is located in Virginia and
that their domain names are included in the registry, they would never imagine that by
registering their domain names they are essentially consenting to have trademark disputes
regarding their domain name property litigated in U.S. courts. See FleetBoston, 138 F.
Supp. 2d at 134-35 (noting that a domain name registrant who registered a domain name
with a registrar located in a particular forum may be expected to have notice that an in
rem action would be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum).
281. See id. at 135 (ruling that the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
would be compromised for in rem proceedings where the domain name owners have no
contact with the forum).
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could not reasonably expect to be hailed into court. 82 By using the
registry as the situs of the domain name res and authorizing in rem
jurisdictions over domain names maintained in the registry, the
ACPA empowered the court to issue an order that reaches beyond
the state of Virginia and the national boundaries of the United
States.283
C. The Formationof an In Rem Court by Default
The by-product of the in rem provision under ACPA is the
formation of a default in rem court for trademark disputes in domain
names. Because in rem jurisdiction is authorized under the statute to
the district courts where the official registry is located, all in rem
actions involving domain names in the .com, .org, and .net top-level
domains potentially could be brought in the Eastern District of
Virginia.2 4 The court becomes the default court in the United States,
if not currently in the world, to adjudicate the ownership of the
property right in the domain names held by foreign registrants.285
In addition to the formation of the default in rem court based on
the location of the official registry, a further aspect of the ACPA in
rem provision facilitates the transformation of the Eastern District
into the default court for trademark disputes in domain names.
Indeed, the in rem provision under the ACPA authorizes in rem
jurisdiction to the courts where "other domain name authority that
282. See id.
283. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 527 (E.D. Va.
2001) [hereinafter Cable News Network II]. The court in Cable News Network II insisted
that its order does not implicate Bulova because the order does not specifically address
extraterritorial conduct. See id. at 518. The court stated that an order requiring VeriSign
to transfer the ownership of the domain name from the Chinese registrant to the plaintiff
is merely "an order requiring a company located in the .jurisdiction to take action with
respect to a domain name that is also located in this jurisdiction." Id. at 518 & n.29.
284. The official registry controlling the domain names in the .com, net., and org
TLDs is held by NSI. See Hestermeyer, supra note 267, at 4 (stating NSI's control of the
file for all domain names); Kesan & Shah, supra note 259, at 184 (stating NSI's control of
the domain name database); supra note 276 and accompanying text (stating that NSI is
located in Herndon, Virginia); see also Smith v. Network Solutions Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d
1159, 1161 (E.D. Va. 2001) (explaining the role of NSI in domain name registrations in a
case where the plaintiff alleged a monopolization claim against NSI); Cable News
Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492 (E.D. Va. 2001) (maintaining in
rem jurisdiction because NSI Registry is located in the district). See generally ICANN,
.COM REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 258; ICANN, NET REGISTRY AGREEMENT,
supra note 271; ICANN, .ORG REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 271.
285. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (ruling the official Registry as
situs for an in rem action and focusing on the nexus that exists between the Registry and
the domain name itself in rendering the in rem action constitutional even though the
registrant has no relationship with the registrar located in the judicial district).
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registered or assigned the domain name" is located.286 The judicial
district where such domain name authority resides, again, is in
Herndon, Virginia-the Eastern District-where NSI/VeriSign is
located.
NSI/VeriSign currently maintains the master root zone server.287

The process of converting domain names into Internet Protocol
numbers begins with the root zone file controlled by NSI. 2s8 The root
zone file is compiled from all registrations in the .com top-level

domain submitted by all authorized registrars worldwide, including
the NSI's registrar unit, and contains the domain names in all the

.com top-level domain and their corresponding numerical Internet

286. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000); see also FleetBoston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 135
(rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the district court of Massachusetts has in rem
jurisdiction over the domain name because the plaintiff arranged for the domain name's
Registration Certificate to be deposited with the court). The court noted that in rem
jurisdiction is predicated on the notion that the res is found within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Id. Adopting the plaintiff's argument would give the plaintiff the
right to transfer the res to any forum, and that would offend notions of fair play. Id. The
court noted that the statute requires the in rem proceedings be brought in the judicial
district where the registrar is located and in this case, the registrar for the domain name is
located in Herndon, Virginia. Id. Consequently, the court ruled that it lacked in rem
jurisdiction over the domain name.
287. See ICANN, .COM REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 258; ICANN, .NET
REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 271; ICANN, .ORG REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra
note 271; see also Name.space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 577, 581-82
(2d Cir. 2000) (discussing NSI's antitrust immunity in a case where the plaintiff contested
NSI's control of the master root zone files); Cable News Network 11, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 514
n.16 (noting that VeriSign maintains the root zone file for the .com TLD); Froomkin,
supra note 270, at 90 (explaining the agreement between the Department of Commerce
and NSI wherein NSI maintained the authoritative root files).
288. See Name.space, 202 F.3d at 577 (describing the process of resolving a domain
name address query). The process of converting domain names into IP [Internet Protocol]
numbers begins with the "root zone file," which is
the highest level of the domain name system and contains the databases enabling
an Internet address query to be routed to its proper destination. The master root
zone server of the DNS [Domain Name System] contains the authoritative root
zone file, from which the other 12 duplicate root zone servers download new
domain name information on a daily basis. The root zone file serves the
functions of directing an address query to the proper TLD [Top Level Domain]
zone file, which contains information regarding the location of the numerous
gTLDs [generic Top Level Domain] and ccTLDs [country code Top Level
Domains]. The TLD zone file in turn directs the address query to SLD [Second
Level Domain] zone files, which contain listings of all SLDs and corresponding
IP numbers under the TLD in question. The SLD zone files then direct the
query to lower level portions of the DNS, until the address query is fully
resolved.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Improvement of Technical Mgmt. of Internet
Names & Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8826 (Feb. 20, 1998)); see also Froomkin, supra
note 270, at 42-43 (explaining the domain name resolution hierarchy).
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Protocols.2 89 Though the Internet Protocol or addresses are assigned

by the registrars for the domain names, NSI controls all entries in the
root zone file and has the ability to change the Internet Protocol
number matched with a particular domain name. 29 ° NSI can control a

domain name by matching the domain name with a different Internet
protocol in the root zone file.291 Accordingly, the Eastern District of

Virginia would be the default judicial district for litigating in rem
actions under the ACPA, because NSI, the authority with the master
root zone server that ultimately registers or assign domain names, is
located in that district. 92

Lastly, the formation of the default in rem court is encouraged by
the ACPA authorization of jurisdiction for courts in the judicial
district where the domain name registrar is located. 29 3 Though other
registrars are now in existence, NSI by far is the registrar with the
most domain name registrations. 294 Further, NSI was and is the

exclusive registrar of domain names in the .com TLD, the most
sought after TLD. 295 NSI, and its new corporate entity as a VeriSign
company, continues to be a major registrar with tight control of the

289. See Name.space, 202 F.3d at 577; Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 488 n.ll;
Froomkin, supra note 270, at 42-43.
290. See supra note 275.
291. Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 488 n.ll.
292. See Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1162 (N.D. Ala. 2001)
("Once a registrar accepts a domain name application, it will, for a fee, have the name
registered in the Registry's WHOIS database."), aff'd No. 01-12255, 2001 WL 1690492
(11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2001); see also Froomkin, supra note 270, at 57 (stating that NSI
controls the computers that held the root zone, is responsible for the mechanics of
inserting new TLDs into the root, and registers second-level-domain names in .com, .org,
and .net on a first-come, first-served basis, under the agreement between NSI and the
National Science Foundation).
293. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
294. See Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; see also Froomkin, supra note 270, at 57
(stating that NSI's monopoly has propelled it into a multi-billion dollar business).
295. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 488 n.l (noting VeriSign is the
exclusive registry for all domain names in the .com TLD). Moreover, VeriSign controls
the registry for other less desirable TLDs such as .net and org. That means the Registry
for such TLDs is located in Virginia. See ICANN, .COM REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra
note 258; ICANN, .NET REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 271; ICANN, .ORG
REGISTRY AGREEMENT, supra note 271.
Recently, ICANN has added seven new TLDs such as info, pro, name, .aero,
.biz, .coop, and .museum. The registrars and their registries for these new TLDs are
located in various states and countries. For example, the registrar for .info is Afilias, LLC,
a company located in Horsham, Pennsylvania, and the registrar for .name is Global Name
Registry, LTD, a United Kingdom company. See ICANN, NEW TLD PROGRAM, at
http://www.icann.org/tlds/ (last modified July 18, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). The new TLDs are not as popular as the .com TLD.
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domain name database.296 NSI has registered almost half of all
domain name registrations.297
Due to the large volume of domain names that already have
been registered by NSI, important decisions relating to in rem actions
will most likely come from the court in the Eastern District of
Virginia where the NSI registrar is located.298 Courts outside that
judicial district consistently decline to hear in rem actions in cases
where NSI is the registrar of the domain name in dispute.29 9 Even in
other ACPA cases, courts probably will look to the decisions

rendered by the courts in the Eastern District of Virginia as
persuasive authority on in rem actions."'
Moreover, because the statute authorizes in rem jurisdiction to
courts in the judicial district in which "the domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name is located,"30 1 the court in the
Eastern District of Virginia has in rem jurisdiction by default based
on the location of the domain name registry. Consequently, at a
minimum, trademark owners, litigants, and the public may not have
the benefits of a broad, collective judicial wisdom beyond that of the
Eastern District of Virginia.

296. See Smith, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (stating that the defendant NSI became a
wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant VeriSign and continues to control the Registry of
all domain name registrations in the .com, .org, and .net TLDs).
297. See id. (stating that the defendant NSI has registered about fourteen million out of
twenty-four to thirty million domain name registrations, "which is more than any other
individual registrar").
298. See, e.g., Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d
340, 343-47 (E.D. Va. 2001) (becoming the first court to address whether a plaintiff could
maintain both in rem and in personam actions); Caesars World, Inc. v. caesarspalace.com
112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 503-05 (E.D. Va. 2001) (becoming the first court to decide whether a
domain name is property for the purpose of an in rem action); Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang,
106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855-58 (E.D. Va. 2000) (becoming the first court to decide whether
digital contact is sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test for in personam
jurisdiction).
299. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 656, 658
(E.D. Va. 2001) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 534
(E.D. Va. 2000) and Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860,
868 (E.D. Va. 2000), for the proposition that in rem action is permissible in cases where
the domain name registrant is foreign or anonymous); FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v.
Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 134 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing Caesars World,
112 F. Supp. 2d at 504, for the proposition that contact between the registrant and the
forum is still required for in rem action).
300. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) (citing Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 503-05 for the proposition that "in
rem jurisdiction under the ACPA does not violate due process.").
301. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
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Regardless of whether the formation of the default in rem court
was intentional, it has serious implications. The Eastern District of
Virginia has slowly become the default court where the registrar, the
registry, and the domain name authority are located. The default
court has the power in such cases to issue orders that impose the
United States' digital trademark rights on the rest of the world. The
default court, in the name of applying national law, provides remedies
available under the ACPA, ordering the U.S. registrar, registry, and
the domain name authority to transfer the ownership of a domain
name held by the foreign registrant to the U.S. trademark holder.3"'

The effect of such an order is extraterritorial, enjoining foreign
registrants' conduct in their home countries and enforcing U.S. rights
in foreign nations unilaterally.3" 3 The formation of the default court is
beyond the intention of the national law to curb cybersquatting
activities allegedly committed by foreign registrants that exploit the
Internet medium to avoid liability.304
Further, like the Ninth Circuit-the Court of Appeals for
Hollywood 3°S-due to geographical location, the Fourth Circuit will

become the in rem cyber-circuit court due to digital existence of
domain names in cyberspace. The Fourth Circuit, however, will
become the appellate world court for adjudicating substantive rights
in domain names in the .com, .net, and .org TLDs held by foreign

302. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 518 n.29 (E.D.
Va. 2001) [hereinafter Cable News Network I1].
303. See id. Indeed, the court recognized that its order of transferring ownership of a
.com domain name may have consequences outside the United States. Id. The court,
however, avoided further analysis by simply noting its order does not amount to "an
American court [ordering] a Chinese company to do or refrain from doing some activity in
China." Id. Rather, the order was merely "requiring a company [Verisign] located in this
jurisdiction to take action with respect to a domain name that is also located in this
jurisdiction." See id. at 518 & n.29.
304. See generally H.R. CON. REP. No. 106-464, at 113-14 (1999) (explaining when in
rem relief is available to trademark holders); H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999) (asserting
that the purpose of House Resolution 3028, the Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, is
to help trademark owners protect their intellectual property); id. at 14 (identifying unique
problems faced by trademark owners in cyberspace due to the lack of in personam
jurisdiction over registrants and explaining how the in rem provision will alleviate the
problems); S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4, 10-11 (1999) (stating that the purpose of Senate Bill
1255, the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act, is to prohibit the bad-faith registration of
Internet domain names); id. (noting that the purpose of the in rem provision is to arm
trademark holders with a means to combat cybersquatters).
305. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that due to its geographical location, the Ninth Circuit
court is the Hollywood appellate court, and its decisions have potential impact on millions
of people whose livelihood depend on intellectual property rights).
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This will have

profound international implications.
V. NATIONAL LAW COLLIDES WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
PRINCIPLES IN CYBERSPACE

National law, such as the ACPA, aims to curb cybersquatting

activities, to protect the rights of trademark holders, and to build
public confidence in the new electronic commerce. Though the law is
national and territorially bounded in scope, the ACPA's effects reach
beyond national boundaries due to the borderless, electronic medium

of the Internet. Enforcement of the in rem provision under the
ACPA potentially violates basic principles of international law.
A.

Ignoring the Paris Convention

The United States has been a signatory to the Paris Convention
since 1883.307 The Paris Convention is a compact between member
countries to extend national trademark rights accorded to the citizens

of their own nation to the citizens of other member countries.3 8
Essentially, foreign nationals would receive the same treatment in
each of the member countries that is afforded its own citizens.3 9 To

receive "national treatment" benefits, foreign nationals must observe
the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals of the member
306. During the editing process of this Article, the Fourth Circuit decided a case
relating to domain names held by foreign registrants. See Harrods v. Sixty Internet
Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 219-20 (4th Cir. 2002). The Harrods court held, among
other issues, that registration of domain names alone amounts to minimum contacts,
justifying in rem jurisdiction by Virginia courts in cases where the claims to the property
itself are the source of the underlying controversy. See id. at 224-25. Unfortunately, the
Harrodsdecision failed to recognize that by allowing in rem jurisdiction, U.S. courts now
essentially govern the conduct of foreign nationals in foreign nations (all in the name of
enforcing U.S. law-specifically the ACPA). It failed to address the requirements
dictated and concerns raised by Bulova and its progeny. Essentially, it failed to address
subject matter jurisdiction and extraterritorial application of the amended Lanham Acti.e., the ACPA.
307. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as
revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; see In re Compagnie Generale Maritime, 993 F.2d 841,
850 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (J. Nies, dissenting) (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 19:24, at
19-27).
308. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956); see
also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:25, at 29-46 (explaining the history of the Paris
Convention and its purposes).
309. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:25, at 29-46 & 29-47 (noting the Paris
Convention ensures that "foreign nationals should be given the same treatment [, as to
trademark and related rights,] in each of the member countries as that country makes
available to its own citizens").
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country.31 0 Further, the conditions for filing and registration of
trademarks are determined in each member country by its domestic
laws.31'
The Paris Convention seeks to create uniformity by obligating
each member nation "to assure to nationals of countries of the Union
The
an effective protection against unfair competition. '312
Convention, however, generally is viewed as not self-executing.31 3
Indeed, the Convention provides that it will become effective only
through domestic legislation.3 14 In the United States, the body of
legislation implementing many provisions, including unfair
competition contained in the Convention, is the Lanham Act.315
310. See Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting
the appellant's reliance on its use of a trademark in Japan to support its claim for priority
in the United States because it was not the first to use the trademark in U.S. commerce);
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985)
(ruling that it was error to admit evidence of the parties' foreign trademark practices
because "[i]t is 'well settled that foreign use is ineffectual to create trademark rights in the
United States' " (citation omitted)).
311. See In re Compagnie Generale Maritime, 993 F.2d at 856 (quoting Paris
Convention, supra note 307, as revised at Lisbon, Oct. 30, 1958, art. 6); Vanity Fair Mills,
234 F.2d at 644 (analyzing section 44 of the Lanham Act governing filing, registration, and
priority of trademarks owned by a foreign national and concluding that all provisions and
benefits under section 44 "relate solely to the registration and protection of marks within
the United States"); see also Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1998)
(ruling that the "registration and use of the Fashion Cafe name in Italy has not, given the
territorial nature of trademark rights, secured it any rights in the name under the Lanham
Act").
312. Int'l Cafd, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 307, at art. 10(1), 53 Stat. 1780). Article
lOter of the Paris Convention requires signatory nations to prohibit unfair competition:
"(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries
effective protection against unfair competition. (2) Any act of competition contrary to
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair
competition." See Paris Convention, supra note 307, at art. l0bis, 53 Stat. 1780.
313. See, e.g., Int'l Cafg, 252 F.3d at 1277 n.5 (noting that the Paris Convention is not
self-executing); BP Chems., Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 259 n.1
(3d Cir. 2000) (same); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298-99
(3d Cir. 1979) (ruling that Article 17 of the Paris Convention supports a conclusion that
the treaty is not self-executing); Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 884 (C.C.P.A.
1973) (noting that the Paris Convention is not self-executing and requires implementing
legislation).
314. See Paris Convention, supra note 307, at art. 17, 53 Stat. 1780 ("It is understood
that at the time an instrument of ratification or accession is deposited on behalf of a
country, such country will be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the
provisions of this Convention."); see also Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1298 (indicating
that the Paris Convention must be implemented by legislation before it creates a private
right of action); Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (noting that
future action by Congress would be needed, as the Paris Convention is not self-executing).
315. Courts have held that the Lanham Act incorporates Article 10bis and thus creates
a federal law of unfair competition applicable in international disputes. See Toho Co. v.
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Because the rights articulated in the Convention do not exceed those
conferred

under

the

Lanham

Act,316

any

trademark

unfair

competition claim must be based in the substantive provisions of the
Lanham Act.317

Under the Paris Convention, each member nation's law must be
limited to territorial application.318 This principle enables countries
with different trademark laws to join the Convention without
changing their basic national laws.319 Common law countries thus
continue to grant trademark protection based on use, while civil law
countries grant trademark protection based on registration.32 ° As a
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The federal right created by
subsection 44(h) is coextensive with the substantive provisions of the treaty involved ....
[Slubsections (b) and (h) work together to provide federal rights and remedies
implementing federal unfair competition treaties." (citations omitted)); see also Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Ignatio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 689-90 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(holding the Lanham Act incorporates unfair competition rights of the Paris Convention);
Laboratorios Roldan, C. por A. v. Tex Int'l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1568-69 (S.D. Fla.
1995) (holding that because the Dominican company was entitled to protection from
unfair competition under the Lanham Act and the Paris Convention, it could bring a
federal claim against an American company for trademark and trade dress infringement
and misrepresentation); Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff, a citizen of France,
could invoke the protections of the Paris Convention and the Lanham Act to assert a
federal cause of action against acts of unfair competition occurring in the United States).
See generally Patricia V. Norton, Note, The Effect of Article lObis of the Paris Convention
of American Unfair Competition Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1999) (reviewing cases
with interpretations of the Paris Convention).
316. See Int'l Cafg, 252 F.3d at 1278 (rejecting the argument that the Paris Convention
creates substantive rights beyond those independently provided in the Lanham Act and
noting other courts have ruled the same). Specifically, section 44 of the Lanham Act gives
foreign nationals the national treatment accorded to U.S. citizens. Id. at 1277. Section 44
of the Lanham Act provides that:
any person whose country of origin is a party to the convention ... shall be
entitled to benefits [under section 1126] to the extent necessary to give effect to
any provision of such convention .... Also, any person covered by section
1226(b) shall be entitled to effective protection against unfair competition, and
the remedies... shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in repressing
acts of unfair competition.
Id. at 1277 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 1126(h)) (alterations in original); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (2000).
317. See Int'l Cafr, 252 F.3d at 1278.
318. See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956) ("The
Convention is not premised upon the idea that the trademark and related laws of each
member nation shall be given extraterritorial application, but on exactly the converse
principle that each nation's law shall have only territorial application.").
319. See In re Compagnie Generale Maritime, 993 F.2d 846, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 1
STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS:

NATIONAL AND

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, §§ 22-28, 564-631 (1975).
320. See In re Compagnie Generale Maritime, 993 F.2d at 850; 2 LADAS, supra note
319, § 659.
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signatory to the Paris Convention, the United States commits that its
law will adhere to the principle of territoriality embodied in Article
6(3)321 of the Convention. 322 Under this principle, the Lanham Act
must recognize each trademark as having a separate legal existence in
each sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally recognized
as a trademark.3 23

In amending the Lanham Act, the in rem provision of the ACPA
erodes the territoriality principle. A U.S. court's order under the in
rem provision to transfer the domain name from the foreign
registrant to the United States trademark owner has the effect of
expanding United States trademark rights into other countries. The
order forces other nations to recognize United States trademark
rights and to acknowledge that the U.S. trademarks have been

harmed globally where the allegedly similar domain names are
accessible. This is contrary to the basic principle of trademarks. A
United States trademark has its existence only within the United
States. The United States trademark has its reputation and goodwill

in accordance with specific national conditions. The goodwill in the
United States differs from and is independent of the goodwill of an

identical or similar trademark in a different nation.324 Moreover, if
the law of a foreign nation recognizes the domain name as a

321. Article 6 of the Paris Convention states: "A mark duly registered in a country of
the [Paris] Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in other countries
of the Union, including the country of origin." See Paris Convention, supra note 307, at
art. 6, 5 Stat. 1780.
322. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 679 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.,
concurring).
323. See Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 640 (analyzing the Convention's principle that
each nation's trademark law must have only territorial application); 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 10, § 29:1, at 29-4.
The contrary approach to territoriality is universality. The premise of the
universality principle is that a trademark identifies the "same source wherever the
trademark is used in the world." See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:1, at 29-4. That
premise is not endorsed by domestic law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24, cmt. f (1995) ("The premise of the universality principle that
trademarks necessarily identify the original manufacturer has been rejected in our
domestic law."). See generally Timothy H. Hiebert, Foundations of Law of Parallel
Importation: Duality and Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80
TRADEMARK REP. 483 (1990) (analyzing the historical foundations for the competing
theories of territoriality and universality of trademarks).
324. Societe Des Produits Nestle v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 636 (1st Cir.
1992) ("Because products are often tailored to specific national conditions, a trademark's
reputation often differs from nation to nation." (citation omitted)); Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 89 F. Supp. 1163, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[A] mark may have not only a separate
legal basis but also a different factual significance in each separate country where the local
mark owner has developed an independent goodwill.").
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legitimate trademark, the territoriality principle under Article 6(3)
requires that the trademark "be regarded as independent of marks
registered in other countries," including the United States.325
In summary, the in rem provision under the ACPA operates on
the premise of a universality principle that a United State trademark
identifies the same source wherever the trademark is used in the
world. The universality principle has long been rejected by U.S. and
international law.326
B. Reaching Beyond Bulova
When a court exercises jurisdiction or issues an order that
extends the application of the Lanham Act extraterritorially, it may
only do so within limitations. Any justifications for extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act must meet the requirements under
Bulova.3 27 The Lanham Act, as recently amended by the ACPA and

as interpreted by the courts, has extraterritorial application beyond
what previously has been allowed under Bulova and its progeny.328
Bulova and its progeny mandate three requirements for
consideration of whether the courts have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear claims involving extraterritorial conduct occurring outside the
United States 329 or whether to issue an injunction prohibiting
extraterritorial conduct that violates the Lanham Act and causes
harm to United States commerce. One, the defendant is a citizen of
the United States331 or has extensive contact and presence in the
Untied States. Two, the issuance of the injunction should not cause
any conflict of law with the foreign nation within whose borders the
extraterritorial conduct was to be prohibited.332
Three, the
325. See Paris Convention, supra note 307, at art. 6, 5 Stat. 1780; MCCARTHY, supra
note 10, § 29.1, at 29-5.
326. The universality principle of trademarks is contrary to what the United States
Supreme Court has long ago embraced-territoriality of trademark rights. See Societe Des
ProduitsNestle, 982 F.2d at 637.
327. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-89 (1952); see also supra
Section I.B (discussing the three requirements).
328. See supra Section I.
329. See Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278
(11th Cir. 2001) (noting the Bulova Court mandated that "the Lanham Act conferred
jurisdiction over extraterritorial disputes involving trademark infringement and unfair
competition when: 1) Defendant is a United States corporation; 2) the foreign activity had
substantial effects in the United States; and 3) exercising jurisdiction would not interfere
with the sovereignty of another nation").
330. See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994).
331. See id. at 250; Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 745 (2d Cir. 1994).
332. See Nintendo, 34 F.3d at 250.
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defendant's conduct is not confined in its effects to the foreign nation
where it occurs 333-the defendant's extraterritorial conduct has
adverse affects on U.S. commerce by harming the reputation and
goodwill of the plaintiff-registrant's trademark in the United States.334

None of these three requirements are present under in rem actions of
the ACPA involving foreign nationals who registered domain names
that allegedly amount to wrongful conduct under the new digital
trademark right.335
The first Bulova requirement is missing from in rem actions

against foreign registrants under the ACPA when, as in Cable News
Network, the foreign domain name registrant was not a citizen,
constructive or otherwise, of the United States.336 Indeed, the foreign

domain name registrant does not even own, control, establish, or
operate any business entity in the United States.337 Moreover, the
foreign domain name registrant has no contact with any forum within

the United States.338 This requirement that the defendant must be a

citizen of the United States or have control over business
establishment in the United States is essential in Bulova and its
progeny as the Lanham Act or any laws of the United States binds its
own citizens, wherever they reside, and non-citizens if they reside in
the United States or control business entities in the United States.339

Since Bulova and prior to the enactment of the digital trademark
right,

courts

had

applied

the Lanham

Act

to

govern

the

extraterritorial conduct of defendants who are U.S. citizens or have
control over the operation of U.S. business entities.340 In rem actions
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 327-34 and accompanying text.
336. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 528 (E.D. Va.
2001) [hereinafter Cable News Network II] (foreign domain name registrant was located in
Hong Kong, China); Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 485
(E.D. Va. 2001) (foreign domain name registrant was a Chinese company).
337. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (foreign domain name registrant's
businesses were directed toward Chinese people in China).
338. See id.
339. See generally Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641-43 (2d Cir.
1956) (discussing U.S. citizenship and the effect on U.S. commerce as considered in
Bulova); Calvin Klein Indus., Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (considering Bulova's application of Lanham Act extraterritoriality).
340. Compare Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enter., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 555-57 (9th
Cir. 1992) (defendant, Betech, was a U.S. corporation), Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade
Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant is a California corporation), Star-Kist
Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant is a
California corporation), with Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250-55
(4th Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding the case where the district court failed to
consider the citizenship of the defendant and the degree of conflict of law requirements),
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under the ACPA now reach defendants that are neither U.S. citizens
nor have control of business entities in the United States, as seen in
Cable News Network, in violation of Bulova and its progeny.
The second condition is that the laws of the foreign nation at
issue must be considered and only rulings that would not cause
conflict with that foreign law may be taken by U.S. courts.34 '

The

issuance of a court's order of transferring the domain name held by
the foreign registrant to the U.S. plaintiff is impermissible because it
has potential conflict with the law and policy of the foreign country
where the foreign registrant resides.3 42 For example, under the law in
China, a domain name registered within China is regulated by the
Provisional Rules for Chinese Domain Name Dispute Resolution
("the Rules").34 3 A domain registered outside China is regulated by

the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP")
adopted by ICANN. 3" The Rules require trademark holders to prove
actual damage resulting from cybersquatting registration.345 Such
requirement serves to discourage trademark holders from bringing a
complaint under the Rules; instead they may opt for proceedings
under China's trademark law in Chinese courts under the theory of
46
3

passing-off.
In the United States, on the other hand, the ACPA specifically
governs cybersquatting conduct.3 47 Federal courts do not recognize

Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colbrone, 14 F.3d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling that none of
the defendants were American citizens and thus "this case does not implicate the United
States' 'broad power to regulate the conduct of its citizens in foreign countries' " (citation
omitted)), Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 647 (ruling that the district court's decision in
declining subject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act was proper in a case where the
defendant is a Canadian company with office in New York, but all employees in New
York had no control over the defendant, and the defendant had a valid trademark right in
Canada).
341. See Nintendo, 34 F.3d at 250 (noting that under Bulova a court's injunction order
must "not interfere with the sovereignty of the nation within whose borders the
extraterritorial conduct was to be prohibited, that nation having expressly abrogated any
conflicting right in the alleged infringer"). The Fourth Circuit stated that "the possibility
of conflict with trademark rights under the relevant foreign law" may render a court's
order "inappropriate in light of international comity concerns." Id.
342. See infra notes 349-57 and accompanying text.
343. See Richard Wu, New Rules for Resolving Chinese Domain Name Dispute-A
Comparative Analysis, 1 J. INFO. L. & TECH., at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-1/wu.html
(created Feb. 28, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that the
Rules "are only concerned with disputes arising from Chinese domain names registered
with the China Internet Network Information Centre").
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See supra Section III.
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the UDRP; decisions rendered under the UDRP are not binding on
federal courts.34 s Potentially, if an ICANN panel ruled in favor of a
foreign domain name registrant, the foreign nation will accept the
panel's decision. On the other hand, if the trademark holder
complainant in that case decided, after the unfavorable UDRP
decision, to bring an ACPA action against the domain name, U.S.
courts are not bound by the UDRP decision and could rule in favor of
the trademark holder complainant. As a result, there is a conflict in
determining the right in the domain name.
Indeed, acknowledging the conflict between trademark law in a
foreign country-which here, as in Cable News Network, was Chinaand the United States concerning rights in the domain name and
trademark at issue, in Cable News Network II, the court declined to
have the case transferred to Hong Kong, China, for fear that the U.S.
plaintiff might not get the domain name from the Chinese registrant
defendant.3 49 Further, China has a different approach to curb
cybersquatting.3 5 ° China limits the registration of domain names to
business entities only, excluding individuals from registering domain
names.35 1 In Hong Kong, China, each business entity can register only
one domain name.352 By regulating and restricting domain name
registrations, China arguably has curbed cybersquatting in its own
view of effectiveness and efficiency, without the need for additional
legislation against cybersquatting 33 The United States, on the other
hand, allows a free and open registration system. Any person can
obtain a domain name, and there is no limitation on the quantity of

348. See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 26-28 (1st Cir.
2001).
349. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 528 n.49 (E.D.
Va. 2001) [hereinafter Cable News Network II] ("[Tlhere is little likelihood that a Hong
Kong forum would enforce the ACPA and there is no reliable indication in this record

that an equivalent remedy would be available there.").
350. See Yvonne Chua, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in the International
Marketplace: New International Boundaries, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
2000:
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MARKETPLACE 255, 277-98 (PLI 2000).

351. See Wattie C. W. Lo & Andre M. Everett, Thriving in the Regulatory Environment
of E-commerce in China: A Guanxi Strategy, 66 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J., Summer
2001, at 17, 19 (stating that Internet companies must have physical presence established in
China in order to register domain names).
352. See Chua, supra note 350, at 296-97 (explaining the proposal to expand the limit
on the registration of domain names on companies and individuals in Hong Kong, China).
353. Trademark holders in cybersquatting cases can rely only on China's passing-off
and unfair competition law against unauthorized registrations of their trademarks as
domain names. See id. at 292-94 (analyzing the first cybersquatting case decided in China,
Ikea v. Beijing Cinet Info. Ltd).
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domain name registrations.354 The United States enacted the ACPA
to protect trademarks against cybersquatting conduct, but otherwise
has no regulation of domain name registrations.355 Accordingly, an
order to transfer the domain name owned by the Chinese registrant
to the U.S. entity may cause a possible conflict with the domain name
rights under Chinese law and policy governing domain names and is
inappropriate in light of international comity concerns.356 An order
similar to the order issued by the court in Cable News Network will
interfere with the foreign country's sovereignty within its borders.357
As discussed earlier, under Bulova, if two of the three
requirements are absent, there is no basis for the extraterritorial
application of the federal trademark law.3 58 Accordingly, without
meeting the two requirements above, courts in domain name in rem
actions under the ACPA should not issue orders that have the global
effects of enjoining foreign domain name registrant's activities in
their home country and the rest of the world.359

Moreover, the third requirement under Bulova mandates a
showing that the defendant's conduct in a foreign nation has an
adverse effect on U.S. commerce.36 ° In actions based on in rem
jurisdiction, like Cable News Network, the foreign domain name
registrant operates its web site aimed at the consumers who reside
primarily outside the United States. 3 61 It seems that when a web site
is operated in the foreign language and aimed at the nationals who
reside primarily inside that foreign nation, the web site and its domain
name will have effects mostly in the foreign nation's commerce.
Because all web sites are accessible globally, their impact radiates to
every corner of commerce in cyberspace, not just the United States.
To demonstrate the adverse effect on U.S. commerce, the U.S.
trademark holder must establish either trademark infringement or
354. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 286, 872 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting the defendant had registered thousands of domain names).
355. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000) (establishing a civil action for cyberpiracy).
356. See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)
(explaining the limitation of a court's orders with extraterritorial effects).
357. See id.
358. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1996)
(asserting that the absence of two factors "is certainly fatal").
359. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1994) (instructing
the district court to draft an extraterritorial injunction carefully to prohibit only those
foreign uses of the trademark by the defendant that are likely to have significant
trademark-impairing effects on Untied States commerce).
360. See Nintendo, 34 F.3d at 250; Sterling Drug, 14 F.3d at 747.
361. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 (E.D. Va.
2001).
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trademark dilution caused by the foreign registrant's use of the

domain name in the United States.3 62
It is overreaching to summarily conclude that a use of a domain
name in China for an online business that is conducted in Chinese,
aiming at Chinese nationals in China, constitutes trademark use in the
United States and causes dilution to or infringes a trademark within
the United States.363 First, the sole registration of a domain name by
a foreign registrant similar to a trademark protected under U.S. law

does not amount to trademark use.36 Second, if the domain name is
used in association with products or services as offered in the web
pages written in a foreign language, targeting consumers in the
foreign registrant's home country, there is no trademark use of the

domain name in the United States market. 365 Third, absent
trademark use in the United States, there is no trademark
infringement or dilution, hence, there is no harm, substantial or
otherwise, to U.S. commerce.366 Accordingly, a court's order with
362. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952) (ruling the jurisdictional
grant in the Lanham Act encompassed the defendant's activities). Indeed, the defendant's
spurious Bulova watches filtered through the Mexican border into the United States and
competed with the plaintiff's products, causing adverse effects on the trade reputation in
plaintiff's market. Id.
363. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515-20 (E.D.
Va. 2001) [hereinafter Cable News Network II] (granting summary judgment against the
defendant based on trademark infringement theory).
364. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling
that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires the defendant to be using the
trademark in commerce). The defendant's registration of common surnames as domain
names and licenses of e-mail addresses using the surnames did not constitute commercial
use. Id. The defendant merely used words that happen to be trademarks for their nontrademark values. Id.; see, e.g., Watts v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 276 (Table),
No. IP 98-1529-C-H/G, 1999 WL 994012, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 1999) (ruling that no
infringement could occur where disputed domain name had not been used in connection
with sale of goods or services on the Internet); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F.
Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Registration
of a trademark as a domain name, without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark
and therefore is not within the prohibitions of the [trademark statutes].").
365. Arguably, due to the global, electronic nature of the Internet, the goods or
services offered on the website carrying the domain name at issue could enter U.S.
commerce. If the foreign registrant indeed engages in business transactions with U.S.
Internet users, the question is then whether such transactions cause adverse effects on U.S.
commerce. This is the third requirement in Bulova. See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F.2d 633, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing Bulova's third requirement of the tripartite
test). All three requirements must be fulfilled in order to satisfy Bulova. Id.
366. To satisfy the "trademark use" requirement the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant has used or is using the domain name as a source recognition in U.S.
commerce. That means the defendant's goods or services in association with the domain
name must be in the stream of U.S. commerce. See generally Person's Co. v. Christman,
900 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant
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blanket global effect in a case where there is a lack of proof of
trademark infringement or dilution under U.S. law is contrary to
Bulova's last requirement of permitting courts to exercise their
authority only when the defendant's foreign conduct has adverse
impact on U.S. commerce.3 67

Further, the court's order under the in rem provision of the
ACPA decreeing the official registry to transfer the domain name to
the trademark holder is tantamount to taking property within the
foreign nation-the domain name-from the foreign registrant
without the involvement of a foreign court. In addition, the court's

order has the effect of enjoining the foreign registrant from using the
domain name in the foreign nation and all other countries in the
world. Because at least two of the three Bulova requirements are

lacking, such an order is unwarranted. Further, as the order reaches
beyond the U.S. borders regulating foreign nationals' conduct in their
home country, it violates the basic principle of territoriality of
trademark laws and international comity.368
C. Discounting the Principleof Jurisdictionto Prescribe

The relevant jurisdiction in determining the application of the
Lanham Act to foreign conduct is the jurisdiction to prescribe.369 The

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
because the petitioner could not sue under the Lanham Act without conducting commerce
in the U.S.); British-American Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., Cancellation No. 26549,
2000 TTAB LEXIS 390, *9 (T.T.A.B. June 14, 2000) (acknowledging the well-established
doctrine of territoriality of trademark rights); Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 935 F. Supp.
458, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ruling that mere advertising efforts of the Milan "Fashion
Cafe" in the United States failed to constitute "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act
because such advertising only had an impact on commerce in Milan).
367. See generally Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(instructing the district court to issue an injunction limited to protecting against
"significant trademark-impairing effects").
368. A counterargument could be made that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to
hear domain name dispute cases because the mere fact that the Internet allows for
worldwide access does not strip an American court of its subject matter jurisdiction under
the Lanham Act over domain names accessible by the users in the United States. Such an
argument fails to address that the Lanham Act can only be applied extraterritorially over
activities directed at the United States (as one of the requirements mandated by Bulova and
its progeny). See Internet Billions Domains, Inc. v. Venetian Casino Resort, No. 01-5417,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11805, at *15-16 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2002) (allowing subject matter
jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff, IBD, brought its claims in the United States and
its web site with the domain name venetiancasino.org uses English to target U.S. users).
369. "There is ... a type of 'jurisdiction' relevant to determining the extraterritorial
reach of a statute; it is known as 'legislative jurisdiction' or 'jurisdiction to prescribe."
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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defines "jurisdiction to prescribe" as "the authority of a state to make
37
The Restatement
its law applicable to persons or activities.""
identifies the "effect principle" and "nationality principle" as two
bases for exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially.3 71 Under the "effect
principle" extraterritorial jurisdiction is warranted if the conduct
abroad has a substantial domestic effect.7 2 Under the "nationality
principle," jurisdiction is recognized over activities, interests, status,
or relations of United States citizens outside the United States.373
According to the Restatement, a state may not exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a foreign person or
conduct when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. The
Restatement provides eight factors for determining whether the
exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign person or conduct is
appropriate.374 The principle of international law of jurisdiction to
prescribe and limitations on the exercise of the jurisdiction are similar
370. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 402; see also Mary Claire St. John, Note,
ExtraterritorialApplication of Title VII: The Foreign Compulsion Defense and Principles
of International Comity, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 869, 873-74 (1994) (discussing the
Jurisdiction to Prescribe international law principle).
371. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 402(1)(c) (providing that "a state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ...conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory"); id. § 402(2) (providing that "a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ...the activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory").
372. See id. § 402(3).
373. See id. § 402(2).
374. The factors include:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403 (Limitations of Jurisdiction to Prescribe). See generally Hartford, 509 U.S. at
818-19 (Scalia, J.,dissenting in part) (analyzing the unreasonableness inquiry of the
jurisdiction to prescribe).
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the Supreme Court's limitations on the extraterritorial application of
the Lanham Act in Bulova.375

Essentially, unless the foreign national's conduct outside the
' effects
United States causes "substantial, direct, and foreseeable"376
upon United States commerce, the U.S. courts have no jurisdiction to
regulate the foreign national's conduct. The ownership of a domain
name and usage of the domain name in cyberspace aiming solely at
the citizens of the nation where the foreign registrant resides most
likely have "substantial, direct, and foreseeable" effects to the foreign
nation, not the United States.377 It is, therefore, impermissible for the
U.S. court to prescribe jurisdiction over the foreign registrant, or its
property or conduct, when the effects caused by the foreign registrant
or its property do not exist in the United States.378 It is also
impermissible for the U.S. courts to transfer the property from the
foreign registrant and to enjoin the foreign registrant from using the
domain name when the connection between the foreign registrant
and the forum state is so attenuated.379 Further, if a nation recognizes
a domain name as legitimate, such recognition will conflict with the
U.S. court's ruling.38° As a result, the extraterritorial reach of the
digital trademark right is unreasonable under the principle of
international law of jurisdiction to prescribe.381
D. Disregardof InternationalComity
The Supreme Court defines comity as "the recognition which
one nations allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
'
judicial acts of another nation."382
Under the principle of
international comity, when a court is faced with the prospect of a
375. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-88 (1952); see also supra
Section I (discussing the application of the Lanham Act to extraterritorial disputes prior to
the growth of electronic commerce).
376. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 403 (noting that the effects in the
territory of the regulatory state is a factor when considering the limitations of jurisdiction
to prescribe).
377. See id. § 403(2)(a). See generally Hartford, 509 U.S. at 818-19 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part) (analyzing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 403)).
378. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 403(2)(a) & (b).
379. See id.
380. See id. § 403(2)(f), (g) and (h).
381.

See id. § 403(1). See generally Hartford, 509 U.S. at 818-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting in

part) (analyzing the unreasonableness inquiry of the jurisdiction to prescribe).
382. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also Pravin Banker Assocs. v.
Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164).
See generally Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "InternationalComity," 83 IOWA L. REV. 893,
893-952 (1998) (analyzing how courts have invoked the phrase "international comity" in
judicial discourse).
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United States law punishing what another nation permits, the court
should analyze the contacts and interest of the United States and the
other nation.383 The court then applies neutral criteria "to select the
law that is more reasonable to apply-the law of the state whose
interest is clearly greater."3 " Essentially, the international comity
principle warrants limitations on the extraterritorial reach of a
statute."'
For example, in a country like China where the country code is
"cn," it is not illegal for Chinese companies to use "cn" as part of
their names or brands.3 86 An order effectively enjoining a Chinese
national from using such a name or mark would not only violate the
principle of trademark territoriality by unilaterally expanding U.S.
based trademark rights into foreign nations,387 but also would violate
the principle of international comity among the law of different
nations.388
The international comity principle was well recognized in

trademark jurisprudence before the arrival of borderless, electronic
commerce.
Indeed, courts in non-Internet trademark cases
considered international comity and denied extraterritorial
injunction. For example, in Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes &
Co.,389 the Ninth Circuit ruled that an injunction against trademark
infringement in the United States should not cover sales made from
Japan to the Philippines because the parties were still contesting their

383. Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust and Securities
Laws: An Inquiry into the "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1801-02
(1992).
384. See id. at 1801-02.
385. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 817-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (discussing how
international comity considerations tempers the extraterritorial application of statutes and
concluding that "[i]n sum, the practice of using international law to limit the
extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence"). Justice Scalia
observed that "international comity is basically a device for determining what effect to
give to foreign public policies, be it reflected in judgments, acts of state, foreign laws or
judicial proceedings." Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See
generally Gary B. Born, Remarks, International Comity and U.S. Federal Common Law,
84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 326 (1990) (discussing the impact of the international
comity doctrine and how the creation of federal common law has become intimately
related to the international comity doctrine as they both share the same federal interests).
386. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 n.7 (E.D.
Va. 2001) (noting many Chinese companies use the "cn" prefix such as cnnctv.com for
China National Communication and Television Net, cnnac.com for China Network and
Communication, cnnettv.net for China Network TV Net).
387. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:7, 29-13.
388. See id.
389. 769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985).
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trademark rights in the Philippines.390 Otherwise, the injunction
would create a conflict with the proceeding there and would violate
39
international comity and fairness. 1
In addition, trademark spill-over advertising cases are instructive
on the practice of applying international comity concerns to limit the
reach of the Lanham Act. Recognizing the inevitable spill-over of
advertising across national boundaries in the global economy, courts
deny injunctions prohibiting trademark infringement triggered merely
by spill-over advertising originating outside the United States
boundaries.3 92

An illustrative example is Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG.393 In
that case, the district court issued an injunction prohibiting defendant
Bayer AG from using the "BAYER" trademark in the United States
and also abroad if foreign use of the trademark might make its way to
the American public.394 The Second Circuit vacated the district
court's injunction order on the grounds that the injunction might have
extensive extraterritorial effects and because the district court failed
to consider the Vanity Fair factors.395 The Second Circuit noted that
the stringent Vanity Fair test is appropriate in cases, including the
case at bar, where the plaintiff seeks a blanket prohibition against a
U.S. corporation defendant's use of the disputed trademark outside
the United States' borders.396 Specifically, the plaintiff in Sterling was
not concerned with the defendant U.S. corporation's use of the
BAYER trademark abroad; the plaintiff did not want the trademark
use abroad to enter the channels of international communication and
commerce that lead the foreign trademark use back to the United
States.397 The Second Circuit instructed the district court to grant an
extraterritorial injunction to prohibit only those foreign uses of the
trademark by the defendant that are likely to have significant
trademark-impairing effects on United States commerce.398
In reaching its decision, the Sterling court was sensitive to
conflict of law among nations in the age of global economy, especially
390. Id. at 1395-96.
391. See id. at 1396 (concluding that "the district court acted in accordance with

principles of international comity and fairness in excluding wholly foreign commerce from
the Lanham Act case before it").
392. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1994).
393. Id. at 746-47.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 746.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 747.
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in cases where the defendant may have a legitimate right to use the
trademark in a foreign country.399 The defendant in Sterling had the
right to use the mark BAYER in countries outside the United States.
Though the use of the same mark by the defendant in the United
States was impermissible, as it might cause consumer confusion in the
United States, that factor alone did not provide the lower court with
the authority to regulate the defendant's trademark use outside the
United States because such use is legal in foreign nations. To
minimize the conflict of law between the United States and other
nations, the Second Circuit limited the lower court to regulate only
conduct engaged by the defendant that would likely have significant
trademark harming effects in U.S. commerce., Moreover, the Second
Circuit recognized that through global economy and communication,
U.S. consumers inevitably might be exposed to foreign advertisement
relating to the trademark BAYER. Through satellite television
perceptions, such foreign trademark advertisement activity-though
the activity may cause consumer confusion among U.S. television
viewers-does not justify the application of the Lanham Act
extraterritorially, given the conflict of law regarding the trademark
use in the United States and other foreign nations. 40 0 The Sterling
court decision is instructive to in rem domain name cases against
foreign nationals whose domain name use may be legitimate in their
home countries and the domain name is accessible by Internet users
globally.
It is imperative that the court hearing in rem ACPA cases
concerning the right to a domain name recognize that the spill-over
effect of domain name use is inherent in global, electronic commerce.
The fact that a legitimate domain name is accessible globally does not
render the foreign registrant's activity trademark infringement or
dilution in the United States and should not be subject to the

399. The Sterling court instructed:
In fashioning the injunction, the Court should "balance the equities to reach an
appropriate result protective of the interest of both parties." Where, as in the
instant case, both parties have legitimate interests, consideration of those
interests must receive especially sensitive accommodation in the international
context. While Bayer AG suggests that we must accept these conflicts as the
unavoidable result of an international community .of nations in which each nation
exercises the power to grant trademark rights, we prefer to allow the District
Court to fashion an appropriately limited injunction with only those
extraterritorial provisions reasonably necessary to protect against significant
trademark-impairing effects on American commerce.
Id. (citations omitted).
400. See id.
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extraterritorial reach of a district court's order adjudicating the
foreign registrant's property right in the domain name.
The extraterritorial reach of the digital trademark right, if it
continues to flourish as applied by the court in Cable News Network,
will erode the international comity principle respected and observed
throughout U.S. jurisprudence. 40 ' The global, electronic accessibility
of a domain name should not be used as the sole basis to prevent
foreign companies from use of a domain name, especially in nations
where such use may be legal and not infringing on any trademark
right within that nation.4 2
E. Global Imposition of the U.S. -Based Digital Trademark Right
Developing national law to combat activities that infringe on
others' rights and hinder growth of certain segments of the economy
is necessary. 43 The evidence supporting that the unauthorized
registration of trademarks as domain names is an act of piracy,
preventing legitimate trademark owners from using their property
right and discouraging consumers from participating in the new,
digital, networked economy, led to the enactment of the ACPA.4 4
The intention to provide a broad remedy to trademark owners led to
the inclusion of the in rem provision in the ACPA.4 °5
Though the in rem provision aims at curbing cybersquatting
activities by defendants who exploit the Internet medium to remain
elusive, the in rem provision represents the unilateral imposition of a
national right on the global community. First, the in rem provision
401. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[The] practice of using international law to limit
the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in [United States
jurisprudence.]").
402. Professor McCarthy recognized that an injunction against a trademark use by a
foreign national in a foreign nation where such use is legal would violate trademark
territoriality principle and international comity. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at
§ 29:7, 29-14 to 29-14.1.
403. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952) ("Congress has the power to
prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United States,
although some of the acts are done outside the territorial limits of the United States."
(citing Branch v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1994)). Indeed, national
law such as the ACPA has been held constitutional. See generally E & J Gallo Winery v.
Spider Webb Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 2001), aff d, 286 F.3d 270 (5th
Cir. 2002) (ruling the ACPA constitutional and noting numerous cases had upheld the
constitutionality of the Act).
404. See generally S. REP. No. 106-140 (1999) (discussing the purpose, legislative
history and analysis of the ACPA); H.R. REP. No. 106-412 (1999) (discussing the need of
and purpose for the House counterpart to the ACPA).
405. See supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
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has global, extraterritorial effects. A court's order may transfer
ownership of a foreign registrant's domain name to the prevailing
U.S. trademark owner.4" 6
The order disrupts the contractual
relationship between the foreign registrant and the foreign registrar
in the foreign nation.4 °7 The order is tantamount to the issuance of an
injunction on a foreign registrant to relinquish its substantive right in
its property, the domain name in the foreign nation.40 8 The order may
be seen as a unilateral seizure of property and enforcement of the
judgment against foreign nationals without the permission of foreign

courts 409
.
Second, the in rem provision permits only U.S. courts,
particularly the district court in the Eastern District of Virginia, to
decide the substantive rights in domain names of all foreign nationals
or entities as long as such domain names are registered in the judicial
district, the domain name is included in the registry located in the
judicial district, or other domain name authority is located in the
judicial district.410 Viewed in this light, the ACPA's digital trademark
right appears to have been enacted solely for the purpose of
protecting United States trademark owners at the expense of

legitimate domain name and trademark owners outside the nation's
physical boundaries. " ' Such conclusions foster the belief that only
national law can adequately provide the relief sought by its trademark

owners and consequently, undermines efforts to resolve domain name
disputes globally using an international approach,412 and suggests that
406. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 518 n.29 & 528
(E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter Cable News Network I] (stating that an injunction against
the foreign registrant will have extraterritorial effects).
407. Id. at 514 (noting that the registrant has contractual relationship with Eastcom, a
Chinese registrar).
408. Id. at 518 n.29 (noting that the injunction has extraterritorial effects, even though
the order specifically on its face concerns non-extraterritorial matters, such as requesting
the Registry to transfer the domain name from the Chinese owner to United States
trademark holder). This approach is short-sighted. As the Second Circuit court in Sterling
instructed, courts must weigh both parties' legitimate interests and consider those interests
in the international context. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 747 (2d Cir.
1994).
409. See Cable News Network I1, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.29.
410. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000); see also supra Section V.A.
411. See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1956)
(declining to extend the Lanham Act because the defendant may have legitimate right in
its trademark in Canada); Sterling, 14 F.3d at 747 (remanding the case for consideration of
the defendant's legitimate right in the trademark outside the United States).
412. Moreover, such belief may encourage development of national law in conflict with
international treaty on trademarks and the international efforts of harmonizing
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement. Indeed, such belief is evident through trademark
owners' objection to the First Draft of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
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Congress created the national law without much consideration for the
international scope of domain name disputes in light of the global
reach of the Internet.413 The intersection of borderless, electronic
commerce with the in rem provision of domain name disputes
transforms the national court's adjudication of territorial trademark
rights into a global tribunal.
Third, the in rem provision leaves an impression that the nation
that can also lay claim to having created the Internet has the exclusive
right to fashion the broadest remedy for its citizens, ignoring
international law and agreements.4 14

Though the United States

initially created the Internet, the growth of the Internet and the
maturity of electronic commerce have and continue to need the
participation of international partners. 415 The status as the leader of
Internet and networked commerce does not mean that the rights of
U.S. trademark owners must be accorded universality, contrary to the
416
principles of trademark territoriality and international comity.
Unilateral extension, though unintended, of U.S.-based trademark

Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters for fear that the Draft Hague Convention
would destroy the in rem remedy against foreign registrants who register domain names
with foreign registrars. See Letter from the International Trademark Association to the
Honorable Q. Todd Dickinson, Director of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (Dec. 1, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from Verizon
Communications to Director of United States Patent and Trademark Office (Nov. 30,
2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
COMMENTS ON DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/haguecomments

/index.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(providing access to responses to the draft convention).
The lobbying efforts were effective as the Second Draft of the Hague Convention
had resolved the issue raised by trademark owners. See id.
413. The House Conference Report provides no discussion on international
implications of in rem actions against domain names registered by foreign registrant who
registered domain names with registrars residing in their nations. See generally H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 113-14 (1999) (discussing cyberpiracy prevention in general as
set out in the ACPA).
414. See Cable News Network, L.P. v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517 (E.D. Va.
2001) [hereinafter Cable News Network I1] ("[.com] is essentially an American top-level
domain.").
415. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(noting that the purpose of transferring the U.S. government's responsibilities in the
domain name system to ICANN is to increase competition and facilitate international
participation in its management).
416. See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:25, at 29-55 to 29-57 (explaining
the principles of the Paris Convention).
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rights in the digital, global, electronic medium will not solve
international domain name disputes.4 17

The problems associated with the in rem provision under the
ACPA highlight the difficulty of developing national law relating to
the Internet and the inadequacy of national law to solve domain
name disputes in an international context.4"'
The potential
international effects of such national law cannot be ignored as the
Internet continues to unleash its impact on every sector of the world.
F.

Alternative Approaches

1. Litigating Disputes in the Foreign Registrant's Home Country
Given the difficulty of applying national law in the Internet
context, alternative approaches are available to solve international
domain name disputes. These alternatives include litigation against
the defendant in his or her home country and initiation of a complaint
against the foreign registrant under the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution ("UDRP").
a. Convenience of Location

As to the first option, litigation against a foreign domain name
registrant in the registrant's home country is unattractive to a U.S.
trademark owner. Obviously, the foreign domain name registrant is
the party that would prefer to have the litigation in the registrant's
home country.4 9 It would be more convenient for the defendant as
all persons and entities involved in the dispute, with the exception
of
42
the plaintiff, would be located in the defendant's home country.

417. See Sharrock, supra note 143, at 827 (discussing limitations of judicial remedies in
cybersquatting cases decided by courts in a number of countries).
418. Even the court in Cable News Network II recognizes "the difficulties that are
inherent in the effort to use national laws to protect intellectual property rights and to
police commercial activity on the global Internet," but the court declined to address the
difficulties. Cable News Network II, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 528 n.49; see also Harrods, Ltd. v.
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 234 n.9 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting the difficult
problem faced by territorial concurrent users of a mark who also want to maintain an
Internet presence using their trademark and leaving the problem for other courts and the
legislatures to address "as they work to harmonize the geographically limited nature of
trademark law with the global nature of the Internet as a medium").
419. See Cable News Network 11, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 528 n.29.
420. Id. at 528 (discussing the registrant's forum non conveniens argument where the
registrant and all persons and entities involved in the domain name dispute are located in
Hong Kong, China).
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b. FavorableLaw

This means the U.S. trademark owner must look to the law
available in the defendant's home country for protection.4 21 Most
foreign nations, at the present time, do not have the same level of
protection for trademarks against abusive domain name registration
as in the United States under the ACPA.422 Moreover, many foreign
nations follow civil law and thus require the United States trademark
owner to have registered the particular trademark in the foreign
country in order to receive appropriate trademark protection.42 3

Generally, unless U.S. companies are doing business in particular
foreign countries, the companies do not register trademarks
overseas.4 24 In addition, lack of familiarity with foreign legal systems
would serve to discourage U.S. companies from pursuing such an
option.425
2. Enforcement of Decisions Under the UDRP
A second alternative for resolving trademark/domain name
ownership disputes is to submit the dispute to the international

arbitration system, known as the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution ("UDRP"). There are some benefits in using the
international UDRP system. Registrants, at the time of domain name
registration, make certain representations about their rights to use the
domain name and that such use does not interfere with the rights of
another party, 426 and agree to be bound by the domain name dispute
421. Id. at 528 & n.29.
422. See generally Alan Drewsen, Amicus Letter of the International Trademark
Association in Ikea Inter-Systems Inc. v. Beijing Cinet Co., Ltd., 90 TRADEMARK REP.
927, 931-33 (2000) (discussing China's Internet Regulations and China's Anti-Competition
Law application in cybersquatting cases); Sharrock, supra note 143, at 826-27 (comparing
judicial remedies inside and outside the United States against cybersquatting).
423. See Oliva Maria Baratta & Dana L. Hanaman, A Global Update on the Domain
Name System and the Law: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Increasing Internet
Competition-Oh, The Times They Are a-changin'!,8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 36566 (2000) (stating that international registrations and individual country registrations are
important because in most countries trademark rights are initially secured by registration);
Domna L. Candido, Domestic and International Trademark Protection Programs, in
UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW 197, 225-26 (2001) (outlining ways to
evaluate trademarks).
424. See Candido, supra note 423, at 226-27 (discussing international trademark
registration strategies).
425. See Baratta & Hanaman, supra note 423, at 365-74 (discussing the complexity of
international trademark law and the difficulties of trademark enforcement).
426. See VeriSign, Service Agreement v.5.8 IT 4 & 17, at http://www.networksolutions.
com/enUS/legal/service-agreement.jhtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
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resolution policy as approved by ICANN.4 27 The UDRP process is
simple and inexpensive.4 8 Without an extensive discovery process,
pre-trial motion practice, or trial, panels of one or three neutrals can
quickly issue their written decisions. 429 The open structure of the
UDRP system allows international legal jurisprudence to develop,
thus avoiding the conflict of law and other problems associated with
the in rem provision under the ACPA.4 31 Though the UDRP system

is open and international, its jurisprudence is not free of certain
American influence. Numerous UDRP decisions rest on trademark
law principles that are rooted in United States jurisprudence.43 1
Further, UDRP decisions are not binding on national courts.432
This policy leaves open the door for conflicts between national courts
and the international tribunals, undermining the development of an
international approach to solving domain name disputes. 433 For
427. As the policy states:
[Y]ou agree to be bound by our current domain name dispute policy that is
incorporated herein and made a part of this Agreement by reference. The
current version of the dispute policy may be found at our Web site:
http://www.networksolutions.com/en-US/legal/dispute-policy.html. Please take
the time to familiarize yourself with that policy.

Id. 8.
428. See Jason H. Kaplan, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Will It
End the Reign of the Cybersquatter?,8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 43, 80 (2000) (discussing the
economic and time advantage of the UDRP); Matt Railo, EntertainingNew Options in the
Fight Against Cybersquatters: Choosing Between Internet Administrative Proceedings and
Federal Court Lawsuits, ENT. L. REP., June 2000, at 4 (noting the efficiency and cost
effectiveness of the UDRP).
429. See Kaplan, supra note 428, at 80 (analyzing the speed of disposing UDRP
complaints).
430. See, e.g., Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World
Intellectual Property Organization, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 194-95 (2002)

(illustrating the successful norm-making through UDRP mechanism to resolve domain
name, intellectual property disputes in cyberspace). See generally Laurence R. Heifer &
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001) (providing
a comprehensive study of the UDRP process).
431. See, e.g., Jason M. Osborn, Effective and Complementary Solutions to Domain
Name Disputes: ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the
Federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
209, 254-55 (noting numerous UDRP decisions that applied United States trademark
law).
432. See, e.g., David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute
Decisions, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 44-46 (2001) (reviewing
court decisions in cases where trademark holders or registrants asserted actions under
federal trademark law in post-UDRP proceedings).
433. See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 28 (1st Cir. 2002)
(stating that a court's decision "that a party is not a cybersquatter under the ACPA, and
that a party has a right to use a domain name, necessarily negates a [panel] decision that a
party is a cybersquatter under the UDRP"); see also BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v.
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example, suppose that a trademark owner from Brazil obtains a
favorable decision from the international tribunal, declaring that the
United States domain name registrant had registered the domain
name in bad faith, and the international tribunal orders the domain
name to be transferred to the Brazilian trademark owner. The
United States domain name registrant immediately files for a
declaratory judgment in a federal district court that she did not
violate the ACPA and consequently she should be allowed to keep
the domain name registration. The above example essentially was the
recent case decided by the First Circuit Court in Sallen v. Corinthian
434
Licenciamentos L TDA.
The court in Sallen ruled in favor of the U.S. domain name
registrant, holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear such a
declaratory action, and remanded the case for further proceeding.435
Assuming that, upon remand, the district court decided on the merits
that the U.S. domain name registrant is not a cybersquatter and has
the right to use the domain name, such a decision would negate the
international tribunal's decision that the domain name registrant is a
cybersquatter under the UDRP.436 Likewise, a U.S. trademark holder
who failed his action under the UDRP can avail himself to a federal
court under the ACPA.437 Because the UDRP decision has no res
judicata effect, the plaintiff can get the domain name transferred from
the registrant if it prevails under the ACPA.
If other nations have enacted similar legislation providing
domain name registrants or trademark holders a means to effectively
negate the international tribunal's decision, resolving domain name
disputes through the international body will become pointless. On
Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that the trademark
owner did not waive its right to judicial relief by virtue of filing the domain name dispute
complaint under the UDRP); Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg.
Supply, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1766, 1767-68 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (concluding that the UDRP
policy "and its accompanying rules do contemplate the possibility of parallel proceedings
in federal court" and that federal courts are "not bound by the outcome of" UDRP
proceedings).
434. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 18; Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. Sallen, No.
D2000-0461 (July 17, 2000) (Bianchi, Sole Panelist), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0461.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
435. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 16, 29-30.
436. Id. at 27 ("A finding by a federal court that Sallen was within his rights when he
used corinthains.com to post Biblical quotes would directly undercut the panel's
conclusion.").
437. See, e.g., BroadBridge Media, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09 (concluding that a
trademark owner that has filed a proceeding under the UDRP may, before, during, and
after such filing, bring an action in federal court).
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the other hand, if the United States is the only nation with such
legislation allowing a domain name registrant to appeal UDRP
decisions to a national court,438 then U.S. domain name registrants
who receive a favorable decision from federal courts in the United
States will not have to obey the international tribunal's decision.
Essentially, it takes very little effort under the ACPA to circumvent
the UDRP regime. This would open the door for more U.S. domain
name registrants to take advantage of a favorable law that is only
available in the United States to have national courts declare that the
registrants have the right to use the domain names in global,
electronic commerce.
Moreover, the declaratory judgment action provision in the
ACPA in favor of the U.S. registrant on the basis that the domain
name is not cybersquatting the foreign trademark is contradictory to
trademark territoriality principle.43 9
Under the trademark
territoriality principle, trademarks that were established outside the
United States are not recognized under the Lanham Act unless such
trademarks are registered or used in the United States."'
Accordingly, a declaration that a U.S. domain name registrant has the
right to use the domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to
the foreign trademark first requires a finding that the foreign
trademark is recognized and protected under U.S. law. 441 A negative
finding will result, however, because, as the facts in the example and
Sallen illustrate, the foreign trademark has been neither registered
nor used within the United States.442 Thus, there could be no ruling in
favor of the U.S. domain name registrant in the declaratory judgment
action on the merits.
On the other hand, a favorable ruling for the U.S. domain name
registrant may suggest that the court recognizes that all foreign
trademarks established outside the United States can be protected
under U.S. trademark law, regardless of whether such trademarks
438. See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 430, at 259-60 (noting that the United States
is the only country with legislation allowing a domain name registrant to appeal UDRP
decision to a national court).
439. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 27 (stating that Congress provided domain name registrants
an affirmative cause of action under the ACPA to recover domain names lost in UDRP
proceedings).
440. See Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (ruling that
under territorial principle of trademark law, foreign use of a trademark provides no basis
upon which to claim trademark priority in the United States).
441. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000) (discussing cyberpiracy prevention); H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 106-464, at 108, 113 (1999).
442. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 21 (stating that the trademark at issue is a registered mark
in Brazil).
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have been registered or used within the United States. This will open
the door for owners of such foreign trademarks to use the ACPA to
assert actions in U.S. courts against domain name registrants and
domain names for violation of the ACPA, violating the basic
trademark
territoriality
principle
and
compounding
the
443
transformation of the U.S. courts into a world tribunal.
Further, it would be contrary to both the text and legislative
history of the ACPA. The legislative history of the ACPA states that
the ACPA "anticipates a reasonable policy against cyberpiracy will
apply only to marks registered on the Principal Register of the Patent
and Trademark Office.""4 This means that a declaratory judgment
action under the ACPA is limited to registrations of domain names
that are identical, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a trademark

recognized under U.S. law. 445
On the other hand, limiting the declaratory judgment actions
only to cases involving U.S. registered trademarks would leave U.S.
registrants without protection against reverse domain name
hijacking 446 committed by foreign trademark owners who did not

register their trademarks with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. 447

443. Indeed, a federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia recently has held that
the ACPA authorizes the court to hear cases concerning foreign trademarks. See
Barcelona.corn v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373-74
(E.D. Va. 2002). Such a decision ignores the established trademark jurisprudence that
trademark law is territorial. Foreign trademarks that are neither registered nor used in
the United States do not receive the protection under U.S. trademark law. Such a decision
turns a U.S. court into world tribunal for all disputes concerning foreign trademarks as
long as the domain names that are similar to the foreign trademarks are registered in the
United States or specifically, in Virginia.
444. Sallen, 273 F.3d at 29 n.13; see H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15 (1999).
445. See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 15; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-464, at 113.
446. Reverse-domain-name hijacking generally refers to a bad faith attempt by a
powerful trademark owner to deprive a legitimate holder of a domain name. For example,
the owner of the toy character trademarks Gumby and Pokey initiated a proceeding
against a twelve-year old domain name holder of the domain name pokey.org. The child
used the domain name for a website for posting boredom-fighting tips and pictures of his
puppy. Luke A. Walker, ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 301 & n.128 (2000).
447. Reverse-domain-name hijacking occurs when "trademark owners abusively assert
their trademark rights to strip domain name from rightful owners." Sallen, 273 F.3d at 1617 (citing ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION
POLICY, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review)).
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Perhaps the UDRP regime should provide an appellate review of
decisions through international tribunals, not national courts.448
Though the UDRP regime has many shortcomings, 449 it has at least
appeared to maintain the open structure where international
jurisprudence will evolve,45 ° minimizing the conflicts between national
laws in international domain name disputes.4 51
CONCLUSION

Global, borderless, electronic commerce through a network of
computers challenges the existence of in rem cyberjurisdiction against
a foreign registrant's substantive right in domain names. The effects
of the ACPA's in rem cyberjurisdiction reach beyond national
boundaries due to the global context of the Internet. As a result, the
in rem cyberjurisdiction creates an unfettered extraterritorial
trademark rights regime in conflict with international law principles
and transforms the district court in the Eastern District of Virginia
into a world tribunal for adjudication of property rights in
international domain name disputes. At this juncture, whether
trademark rights in cyberspace will become universal, abandoning the
long held and internationally accepted territoriality doctrine, remains
to be seen.

448. A. Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on WIPO's The Management of Internet
Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, TT 124-27 (May 19, 1999) (analyzing
the appellate weakness of the UDRP regime), at http://www.law.miami.edu/-amfl

commentary.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
449. See Sharrock, supra note 143, at 831-44 (analyzing the flaws in the UDRP regime
that includes inconsistency among UDRP decisions, country code conflicts and nonapproved TLDs).

450. The UDRP structure allows for the application of the "lowest common
denominator of internationally agreed and accepted principles concerning the abuse of
trademarks." WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, supra note 91.
451. See Heifer & Dinwoodie, supra note 430, at 260-66 (discussing choice of law rules

in UDRP's international regime); Kwakwa, supra note 430, at 189-95 (explaining how
UDRP regime is successful through the use of internationally recognized norms and

standards and "a system of best practices for domain name registration authorities").
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